

THE
LIFE & DEATH
OF
POMPONIVS ATTICVS:
WRITTEN

By his Contemporary and Acquaintance *Cornelius Nepos* ;
Translated out of his Fragments.

TOGETHER WITH
OBSERVATIONS

By
POLITICAL and MORAL
Judge thereupon. *Hale*

LONDON,

Printed by *W. Godbid*, for *W. Shrowsbury*, at
the Bible in *Duke-Lane*, 1677.

THE DEATH

OF

THE

OF

THE

THE



TO THE
EPISTLE
TO THE
READER.

READER,

THis Book presents
Thee with the *History*
of the Life & Death
of POMPONIUS AT-
TICUS, and the various Concu-
sions and Revolutions that hap-
pened in the Roman State and Go-
vernment in his time; and the
wise Methods which that excel-
lent man used to preserve the
Honour, Innocence and Safety of his
Person from the Dangers that
might occur by them.

A 3

Two

The Epistle

Two Things I must caution thee in reading hereof;

First, Concerning the Person and Practice of *Atticus*. Many things in him are worthy of Imitation; his *Prudence*, *Learning*, *Benevolence*, *Compassion*; his great Care to avoid engaging in any of those Factions that gave those great Disturbances in the State of *Rome*; his Love to his Country.

But some things were appropriate to his Person, Conditions, and Circumstances, and the Manners and Occurrences of that State wherein he lived, that are hardly to be match'd in any other Person; and therefore may possibly in these respects rather give matter of admiration of his Fortune, than matter of imitation of

to the Reader.

of some of the Transactions of his Life.

Secondly, Concerning the Commonwealth of Rome, which in the time of Atticus, was the Theatre whereupon the Heads of the several Parties and Factions acted their parts, to the great disturbance of that State, whereof some Account is hereafter given.

The Constitution of Kingdoms, States and Commonwealths, are in themselves very various, but oftentimes much more various in the Circumstances that attend them, as the Temper and Disposition of their Officers, their different Managements, their publick Concerns with other Nations, and infinite more: so that it seems impossible that two States may in all things exactly match one another;

The Epistle

ther; whereby it comes to pass that some Kingdoms, States and Commonwealths are more obnoxious to Publick Evils; especially that of the Collision of Factions than others.

Some Governments (especially that of this Kingdom of England) are so wisely constituted, and so firmly established and fixed by Law and Custom, that in all Humane Reason, they are not much obnoxious to such Factions: But if such at any time should happen, yet they are quickly composed, or effectually suppressed, or languish and die of themselves in a little time: But the State of the Commonwealth of Rome was so moulded, that it was scarce possible for them to be long without such Storms and Commotions by great Factions

to the Reader.

Factions arising therein; as is hereafter shewn.

That therefore which is written in this Book, was not written in relation to any *Kingdom or State* on this side *Rome*, nor even to *Rome* it self, otherwise than it stood under those Circumstances of those Factions that were frequent therein about the time of *Atticus* his Life.

Therefore read this Book with its due application to the *Roman State*; and to that State as it was in at that time of those Disturbances, and as if thou hadst been a Spectator of the Scene where those Tragedies were acted, and then thou answerest the intention of the Writer; and possibly this Pamphlet may give thee the innocent diversion of an hour, and in
some

The Epistle

some measure give thee an Account of the State of the *Roman Commonwealth*; and the reason of the Occurrences that happened therein in and near the time of the Life of *Atticus*; though it be by no means applicable to the *Kingdom, State and Countrey* wherein thou livest: and so I close to
So If thou find the Translation of the Life of *Atticus* not to run so smoothly as could be wished, I have this Excuse for it, that as near as I can, I have in the Translation pursued the Letter of the *Original*; which, by reason of the difference of *Idioms* in the *Latin* and *English*, will not allow that Elegance to the Translation, as it is to be found in the *Original*. In the Equation of the *Roman* Money with the value of Ours,
and I

to the Reader.


I may in some places be mistaken, because of the discrepance between them; but this may fairly be rectified by the Reader, and is not of any great consequence to the *History*. The *Errata* of the Press are inserted at the End of the Book, together with some few *Addenda*.

Farewel.

THE

I may be some place to find
ken, picture of the difference
may be found, or it may be
ly be reached by the Reader and
is not of any great importance
to the subject. The value of
the paper is information, and
of the book, and the value
of the book.

THE



THE CONTENTS.

THe Life of Pomponius Atticus,
written by his Contemporary and
Acquaintance Cornelius Nepos,
Translated out of his Fragments.
Pag. 1.

Chap. 1. A brief Chronological Account of the Life of Atticus. p. 33.

Chap. 2. Touching Factions in general, and the reasons of the great Factions in the Roman Empire, and why they happened more at this time than for many hundreds of years before. p. 59.

Chap. 3. Concerning the Methods that ordinarily persons use to secure themselves in the Vicissitudes of prevailing Factions. p. 96.

The Contents.

Chap. 4. Touching the Means where-
by the Safety of Atticus was pro-
cured under the various Vicissitudes
in the Roman State. p. 105.

Chap. 5. Touching the means that
Pomponius Atticus used to save
himself from the Dangers of the
Civil Wars that happened in Rome;
and first concerning the quality and
condition of the man himself. p. 117

Chap. 6. Concerning the other Ex-
pedients that this wise man used to
avoid the difficulties of the times
wherein he lived; and first of his
Travels into Greece. p. 126.

Chap. 7. The second Expedient that
he used for his safety and preserva-
tion; his industrious avoiding of be-
ing engaged in any Faction while he
lived in Rome. p. 134.

Chap. 8. The third Expedient that
Atticus used for his safety; refu-
sing

The Contents.

sing too great Kindnesses from
Great Persons. p. 159.

Chap. 9. The fourth Expedient of
Atticus; refusing Offices and pub-
lick Employments in the Common-
wealth by the Suffrages of the Se-
nate or People. p. 165.

Chap. 10. The fifth Expedient that
Atticus used to preserve himself,
was the avoiding all those occasions
that might procure unto him emula-
tion or envy. p. 181.

Chap. 11. The sixth Expedient; the
avoiding of all occasions of enmity
from any. p. 189.

Chap. 12. The consideration of things
that Atticus did in order to his safe-
ty and security against Dangers and
Troubles of the Times; and first,
touching his Charity, Bounty and
Liberality. p. 199.

Chap.

The Contents.

Chap. 13. The second thing which Atticus did in order whereby he secured himself. p. 211.

Chap. 14. The third Expedient conducing to the safety of Atticus; his admirable moderation and equality of Mind & Actions. p. 216.

Chap. 15. Concerning the fourth Expedient conducing to the safety of Atticus; his Constancy. p. 222.

Chap. 16. Touching certain Cautions to be used in the observation and imitation of the Life of Atticus in publick collisions of Factions. p. 228

THE



THE
LIFE

OF

POMPONIUS ATTICUS:

*Written by his Contemporary and Acquaintance CORNELIUS NEPOS;
Translated out of his Fragments.*

POMPONIUS ATTICUS, being deduced from the first Origin of the Roman Stock, obtained the dignity of a Roman Knight, derived unto him by an uninterrupted Succession from his Ancestors. He had a diligent and indulgent Father, and rich according to
B those

those times, and a great Lover of Learning: As he loved Learning himself, so he instructed his Son in all that Learning wherewith one of his Age was fit to be furnished. Moreover, in this young youth, besides his readiness of wit, there was a certain sweetness of Elocution and Speech, whereby he did not only readily learn what was taught him, but did also excellently pronounce it: By which means, even in his youth, he became eminent among his equals, and shone forth with greater lustre than his generous fellow-Scholars could bear with an equal mind. He therefore by his study pricked on others; Among whom were *P. Torquatus*, *C. Marius*, the Son of *Caius*, and *M. Cicero*, all whom by his conversation, he so obliged unto him, that none was dearer to them than he. His Father died early. And *Pomponius* being then but a very young man, was not without some danger, by reason of the affinity of *P. Sulpitius*, who was slain being Tribune of the People. For *Amicia* the Niece of *Pomponius*,

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 3

ninus, married *Servius Sulpitius*, Brother of *P. Sulpitius*. *P. Sulpitius* therefore being thus slain, as soon as *Pomponius* observed that the City was disturbed by the Tumult of *Cinna*, neither could he have liberty of living according to his Rank, but that he should offend one Party; the minds of the Citizens being disjointed, while some favoured the party of *Sylla*, others the party of *Cinna*. Concluding it therefore a seasonable time to addict himself to his Studies, he went to *Athens*, and yet nevertheless helped with his wealth young *Marius*, then declared a publick Enemy; whose flight he assisted with his Money. And lest this his journey should bring some detriment to his Estate, he removed thither a great part of his wealth. He so lived at *Athens*, that he became deservedly most dear to the *Athenians*: For besides that great Grace which appeared in him, being then but young, he oftentimes relieved their publick wants with his own Wealth. For whereas here was a necessity of publick *Versura*, taking up

money at less interest, and to put it out at greater; neither had they any equal conditions in the doing thereof; he ever interposed, and in such a manner that he never received any usury from them, nor suffered his money to continue longer in their hands than the time appointed; both which were of great advantage to them: For hereby he did neither suffer their debts to grow stale by indulgence, nor to grow greater by the running on of usury. Also he added to this friendliness by another liberality: He gave Corn to all, so that to each person were given six measures of Wheat, which kind of measure at *Athens*, is called *Medimnus* (something more than our *English* Bushel) he carried himself so, that he seemed common to the lowest, and yet equal to the chiefest; whereby it came to pass that they publicly heaped upon him all the honours they could; endeavouring to make him a free Citizen of that City; which yet he refused (which some interpret because the liberty of a Citizen of *Rome* would be lost by becoming the
Citizen

Citizen of another City.) As long as he was there, he opposed the setting up of any Statue for him; but could not hinder it after his departure; therefore they placed some for him and *Pilia* (his Wife) in their most sacred places; for in all the businesses of the Republick they had him their Actor and their Author.

Therefore it was first the bounty of his Fortune, that he was born in that City wherein was the Palace of the Empire of the World, whereby he had the same for his Countrey and Governels. But it was the evidence of his prudence, that when he came into that City that excelled all other in Antiquity, Humanity and Learning, he became most dear unto it above all others.

When *Sylla* came hither, as he returned out of *Asia*, as long as he was there, he kept *Pomponius* with him, being taken with the Humanity and Learning of the young man; for he spake *Greek* so well, that he seemed born at *Athen*. But so great was his

sweetness in the *Latine* Tongue, that there appeared to be in him a certain native grace, and not acquired. He pronouced Poems in *Greek* and *Latine*, so that nothing could be done better: By which means it came to pass, that *Sylla* would never let him go from him, & desired to carry him along with him. To whom, when he endeavoured to perswade him, *Pomponius* said, I pray thee do not desire to lead me against those (with whom, lest I should bear arms against thee) I left *Italy*. But *Sylla* commending the kindness of the young man, departing from *Athens*, commanded that all the Presents which he had there received, should be delivered to *Pomponius*. Here living many years, he employed so much of his endeavors for the affairs of his Family, as he became a diligent Father of a Family, and allowed all the rest of his time either to Learning, or the affairs of the Commonwealth of the *Athenians*; yet nevertheless he performed all civil offices to his Friends. For he came to their Assemblies, and
if

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 7

if any great business was in action, he was not wanting: He yielded a singular fidelity to *Cicero* in all his dangers; To whom, flying from his Countrey, he gave 250000 *Sestertia* (two thousand eighty three pounds six shillings eight pence) but the *Roman* affairs being appeased, he returned to *Rome*, *L. Cotta* and *L. Torquatus* being (as I think) Consuls. Which day the *Athenians* so entertained, that by their Tears they shewed their sorrow for their future loss. He had an Unkle, *Q. Cecilius*, a *Roman* Knight, and a friend of *L. Lucullus*, rich, of a nature hard to be pleased; whose frowardness he so weathered, that he kept, without offence, the good will of that man, to his extreamest old age, whom no other could patiently bear; by which means he gain'd the fruit of his observances: For *Cecilius* dying, by his Will adopted him, and made him his Heir of three fourth parts of all he had; out of which inheritance, he received centies L L S. (or to the value of 300000 Crowns according to some;

or 83360 *lib.* according to others.) His Sister was married to *Q. Tullius Cicero*; which Match *M. Tullius Cicero* brought about; with whom, being his School-fellow, he lived most entirely, and much more familiarly than with *Quintius*: whereby it appeared, that in Friendship Likeness of manners was far more prevalent than Affinity. He used *Q. Hortensius* very intimately (who in thole times obtained the Mastery of Eloquence) so that it was hard to understand who loved him best, *Cicero* or *Hortensius*. And herein he effected that which was of greatest difficulty, that between those betwixt whom there was the greatest emulation of praise, there interceded no detraction, and that he became the common uniter of them both. He carried himself so in the Commonwealth, that he always was, and was thought to be of the best party; yet he would not commit himself to the wayes of Civil Dissention; which he esteemed to be no more in the power of him that should deliver himself over to them, than

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 9

than if he had been tossed on the waves of the Sea. He sought not honours, although they lay open to him; either by reason of his Favour or of his Dignity, because they could neither be sought according to the ancient use, nor taken up with due observance of the Laws, among those excessive charges that accompanied such Competitions, nor could they be born in the Commonwealth without danger, the manners of the Citizens of Rome being very much corrupted.

He never came to publick Sales, neither became he a publick Farmer of any thing, or a Surety thereof. He accused no man either by his own subscription, or by proxy. He never went to Law touching his own Interest, nor had any Law-suits. He entertained the Prefectures of many Consulates and Prætors offered unto him, that he would follow none to a Pronounce, being contented with the honour of the Offer, but despised the fruit of its private advantage; and would not go even with *Q. Cicero* into

into *Asia*, when he might have obtained the place of Legate with him. For he thought it became not him who would not be a Prætor, to become the follower of a Prætor. In which thing he did not only serve his own Dignity, but also his own Tranquillity; while he avoided the very suspicions of offences: Whence it came to pass, that his respect was the more valuable to all men, which they plainly saw was to be attributed to his kindness, and not to hope.

The Civil War of *Cæsar* happened when he was about 60 years old. He used that Vacancy that belonged to his Age, neither did he stir any way out of the City. All those things that were needful for such of his Friends as went to *Pompey*, he supplied out of his own Estate. Neither did he offend his Friend *Pompey*; for he would receive of him no eminent bounty, as others, who by his means obtained honours or wealth, part of whom, even against their wills, followed him to the Field, and part staid at home, not without his great

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. II

great offence. But the sitting still of *Atticus* was so acceptable to *Caesar*, that when he returning Victor, commanded Money from private persons by his Letters, he was not only not troublesome to *Atticus*, but delivered up the Son of his Sister and *Q. Cicero*, taken in *Pompey's* Camp. Thus by keeping the old course of his Life, he escaped new dangers. After this, it followed, *Caesar* being slain, when the Commonwealth seemed to be wholly in the power of *Brutus* and *Cassius* and their party, and the whole City seemed to stand at gaze what *Atticus* would do, He so dealt with *M. Brutus*, that that young man used no Equal more familiarly than he did this aged *Atticus*; and had him not only the Governor of his Council, but also the Companion of his Table. It was contrived by some, that a private Treasury should be raised for the Murderers of *Caesar* by the *Roman* Cavalry. They thought this might easily be effected, if the chief of that Order did contribute Money.

There-

Therefore *Atticus* was called by *C. Flavius*, a familiar Friend of *Brutus*, that he should be the chief of that Undertaking: But he who always esteemed good Offices to be done to his Friends without Faction, and always kept himself from such kind of Councils, answered, That if *Brutus* would use any of his Riches, he might use what they were able to bear. But that he would neither speak nor meet with any person about that matter. So that Ball of Contention by this one man's discretion was broken. Not long after, *Anthony* began to be uppermost, so that *Brutus* and *Cassius* (the Affairs of those Provinces (which by way of dissimulation were assigned to them by the Consuls) being desperate) were banished. *Atticus*, who would not give money with others, to that Party when it flourished, sent to *Brutus*, being now an Abject, and going out of *Italy*, *L. L. S. Centum*, or 3000 Crowns, and gave order, being absent, that 300 *Sesteria* more should be delivered to him in *Epirus*: Neither

ther did he, upon his Change, the more flatter *Anthony*, or leave the distressed. After this followed the Battle at *Mucinia*, wherein, if I should only call him prudent, I should say less than I ought; when rather he was divine, if a perpetual natural goodness, which is neither shaken nor diminished by any Casualties, is to be called Divineness.

Anthony being a declared enemy, went out of *Italy*, having no hope of restitution; not only his Enemies, who were then powerful and many, but even his very Friends gave themselves up to his Adversaries, and hoped they should obtain some benefit by hurting of him; persecuting those of his Family, desired to plunder his wife *Fulvia* of all her goods, and went about to destroy his Children, *Atticus* using a most intimate familiarity with *Cicero*, and being most friendly to *Brutus*, did not only not allow them to injure *Anthony*; but on the contrary, as much as he could, hid those of his Family flying out of the City, and helped them

them with the things they wanted: And to *P. Volummius*, such things, that more could not have been from a Father. And whereas *Fulvia* was involved in Suits, and vexed with great terrors, he performed his Office of kindness toward her with so much diligence, that she gave no pledge without *Atticus*: He was the Surety for all things. And further, whereas in her prosperous Fortune she had bought a Farm to be paid at a day; and after this calamity, could not take up money to pay, he interposed himself, and sent her Money without Usury and without Security; esteeming it the greatest gain to be known to be mindful and grateful; and to make it manifest that he was used to be a friend to men, and not to Fortune, which things while he did, no man could well think he did it to serve the time: For no man thought that *Antony* could ever return again. Nevertheless he was reproved by some great men, that he seemed too little to hate evil Citizens: But he being constant to his own

own judgment, respected rather what was fit for him to do, than what others were ready to commend. The wheel of Fortune is suddenly turned. As *Antony* returned into *Italy*, every man thought *Atticus* was in great danger, by reason of his intimate familiarity with *Cicero* and *Brutus*: *Atticus* therefore at the coming in of the Emperor, withdrew from the City, fearing Banishment, and hid himself with *P. Volummus*, to whom, as we have a little before shewn, he gave his assistance (so great was the variety of Fortune in those times, that sometimes these, sometimes those were in the greatest power or danger) and he had with him *Q. Gellius Canius* his Equal, and very like him. And this is another example of the goodness of *Atticus*, that he lived so entirely with him whom he knew his Playfellow from a Boy, that their friendship increased even to their utmost old Age: But *Antony*, though he was carried with so great hatred against *Cicero*, that he was not only an enemy to him, but also to all his

Friends,

Friends; and would banish them all; yet many reminding him, he remembered the good offices of *Atticus*: and when one had enquired where he was, he wrote to him with his own hand, that he should not fear; and that he should presently come to him; that he had exempted him and *Gellius Canius* from the number of the banished: And lest he should fall into any danger, because it was night, he sent him a Guard.

Thus *Atticus* in his greatest fear, was a safeguard not only to himself, but also to him whom he held most dear: For he sought not only for his own safety, but joyntly for others; that it might appear, that he would, no Fortune of his should be disjoynted from his Friend: Therefore if a Pilot deserves great praise, that saves his Ship from the Storm and Rockie Sea, why should not his singular prudence be valued, which out of so many and so great Civil Storms came to safety? And to discharge himself from these evils, he did nothing else than to become

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 17

come an assistance to the most in what he could. When the common people by the rewards of the Conqueror, redeemed some of those that were banished, none of the Banished came into *Epirus*, to whom any thing was wanting; and all that came thither, had liberty of remaining there. But also after the Battel at *Philippi*, and the death of *Cassius* and *Brutus*: He purposed to protect *L. Julius Merilla* the Pretor, and his Son *Aulus Torquatus*, and the rest that were stricken with the like Fortune, and took order that to them all things necessary should be privately conveyed from *Epirus* to *Samothracia*. It is difficult to reckon up all things he did, and note such as are necessary to be remembred. This one thing we would to be understood, that his Liberality was neither temporary nor crafty: That may be judged by the things and times themselves, that he commended not himself to those that were prosperous, but always helped those that were in distress. Who

C

there-

therefore respected *Servilia* the Mother of *Brutus* no less after his death, than while he flourished: Thus managing his Liberality, he maintained no enmity, because he neither injur'd any, neither if he received any injury, had he rather revenge than forget it. With a never dying Memory he retained Benefits received; but those which he did, he only remembred so long as he continued grateful that had received them. He did therefore so, that it seems truly said, Every man's Manners fashion to every man his own Fortune: And yet he first fashioned himself before his Fortune, who took care that in nothing he might be justly punished. By these things he brought to pass that *M. Vip- sanius Agrippa* (one joyned to young *Cesar* in intimate familiarity) who by reason of his own Favour, and *Cesar's* Authority, had a power upon persons of every condition, did chiefly desire the affinity of *Atticus*, and sued to have the Noble Daughter of this *Roman* Knight in Marriage, and the

the maker of this Match was *M. Antony* the *Triumvir* of the Commonwealth; by whose Favour, when he might have increased his Possessions, he was so far from the desire of Money, that he used it in no other thing than in deprecating either the dangers or inconveniences of his Friends: Which was eminent even under the very Proscription it self. For whereas the *Triumviri*, according to the custom whereby things were then managed, sold the Goods of *L. Sanseus*, a Roman Knight, his Equal, who lived many years at *Athens*, being thereunto led by the desire of Philolophy, and had fair possessions in *Italy*. By the Labour and Industry of *Atticus*, it was brought to pass, that by the same Messenger, *Sanseus* was informed that he had lost his Patrimony, and re-obtained it again. The same *Atticus* delivered *Julius Claudius*, the most elegant Poet of this Age, next after the Death of *Lucretius* and *Catullus*, and a very good man, well instructed in the best Arts; who after the Proscription

of the *Roman* Knights, was for his large possessions in *Africa*, brought into the List of the banished in his absence, by *P. Volumnius* General of the Workmen of *Antony*; which at present it is difficult to judge whether it was more painful or glorious for him to effect, because it was known that *Atticus* had a care for his Friends in their dangers, whether absent or present.

And this man *Atticus* was esteemed no less a good Father of a Family, than a good Citizen; for whereas he was full of money, no man was less a Buyer, or less a Builder: And yet he dwelt very well, and enjoyed all things of the best: For he had a House in the *Quirinal* Hill, left to him hereditarily by his Uncle, whose pleasantness was not so much in the building, as in the Groves adjoining. For his House being an ancient built House, had more of Decency, than of Cost; wherein he changed nothing but what he was compelled to by its decay.

He

He had a Family, that if we may judge by its profitableness, was the best; if by the form of it, not mean; for in it were most learned Youths: excellent Clerks, and many well read in Books; that there was scarce a Foot-boy, but could well do any of these businesses; in like manner other Artificers requisite for household Affairs, singular good: And yet he had none of these, but such as were born and taught in his House; which is a sign not only of Continnence, but of Diligence. For not intemperately to desire that which thou see'st desired of many, ought to be esteemed the sign of a continent person: And to procure rather by diligence than purchase it, of no small Industry. He was neat, not stately; handsom, not sumptuous; he affected with all diligence a cleanliness without superfluity: His Household-stuff moderate, not much; so that in it neither Extream appeared: Neither shall I pass by this, although I guess it may seem light to some: Whereas he was a

chief *Roman* Knight, and did very liberally invite men of all Ranks to his House, yet we know that he spent not monthly more than 3000 *Aerii*; (about 10*l.* sterling:) and this we speak not by hear-say, but of our own knowledge; for by reason of our familiarity with him, we were often present at his domestick Affairs. No man in his Feasts heard any other *Acroama* than a Philosophical Lecture, which we esteemed most pleasant; neither did he ever sup without some Philosophical Lecture, that his guests might be delighted as well in their minds, as in their appetites; for he invited those whose manners agreed with his. When so great an accession of Money happened to him, he changed nothing in his daily deportment, nothing in the custom of his Life: And he used so great moderation, that neither under the 200000 *Sesterces* (or 60000 Crowns) he had from his Father, he carried himself less splendidly, nor under the 100000 *Sesterces*, or 30000 Crowns (which he had from

from his Unkle) he lived with greater affluence than he before had appointed: But under both Fortunes he used the like port. He had no Gardens, no Country-House, or sumptuous maritime dwelling. Nor in *Italy* had he more than his Countrey Farm of *Ardeali* and *Munantum*. All his Rents were in what he had at *Epirus*, and City possessions, whereby it may be known, that he was fully accustomed to measure out the employment of his Money, not by vast expence, but by Reason. He neither would speak, nor could suffer a Lie: Therefore his Mirth was not without severity, nor his Gravity without affability; so that it was hard to understand whether his Friends more revered than loved him. When any thing was desired of him, he promised always with religious observance; because he judged it the part of a light, not of a liberal man, to promise what he could not perform. His care was so great in endeavouring the fulfilling of what he once undertook for any other, that he seemed

herein not so much to do anothers business, as his own: He never was weary of any business he undertook; for he esteemed his own credit to be concerned in it, than which, nothing was dearer unto him: Whence it came to pass that he performed all the businesses of *M. and Q. Cicero*, *Cato*, *Hortensius*, *Aulus*, *Torquatus*, and many other Roman Knights besides.

Whereby it may be well judged that he avoided the procuration of the Commonwealth, not for sloth, but in judgment. I can give no greater testimony of his humanity, than that being a young man, he was most delightful to *Sylla*, an old man; and being an old man, most delightful to *Brutus*, a young man: But with his Equals, *Q. Hortensius* and *M. Cicero*, he so lived, that it is hard to judge for what Age he was fittest. Although *Cicero* so greatly loved him, that his Brother *Quintus* was not more dear or familiar to him: And this was an evidence hereof, that besides those Books that are now published,

lished, in which he makes mention of him, there are sixteen Volumes of Epistles sent to *Atticus*, from the first Consulate of *Cicero*, to the last end of his life; which whosoever reads, will not much want a continued History of those times: For all things concerning the designs of the great men, the faults of the Commanders, the changes of the Commonwealth, are so fully written, that all things appear in those Writings, and it may be easily collected that Prudence is in a manner Divination: For *Cicero* did not only foretel those things that afterwards fell out in his life-time; but also he presaged, as a Prophet, those things that now come to pass. And what should I relate more touching the Piety of *Atticus*, when as I my self heard him truly glorying at the Funeral of his Mother, who being 90 years old, he buried when he was 67 years old, that he never was reconciled to his Mother, nor ever was at difference with his Sister, who was near his own Age; which

was

was a sign that either there was never any controversie between them, or that he was of that indulgence to his Relations, that he held it a crime to be angry with those whom he ought to love. Neither did he this only by nature, although all of us ought to obey it; but also by his Learning: For he so well understood the precepts of the chief Philosophers, that he used them for the ordering his life, and not for ostentation. He was a strict imitator of the customs of the Ancients, and a lover of Antiquity, which he so diligently knew, that he declared it in that Volume where with he adorned the *Roman* Magistrates: For there was no Law, no Peace, no War, no notable thing of the People of *Rome*, which is not set down in its order of time in that Volume. And (which is a thing of great difficulty) he so unfolded the Original of Families, that we may thereby know the pedigrees of eminent men: He did this also severally in other Books, so that at the request

quest of *M. Brutus*, he deduced in order the *Junian* Family from its root down to this Age; setting down who, and of whom every one arose, what honours they received, and in what time. In like manner, he did at the request of *Marcellus Claudius*, touching the Family of the *Marcelli*: And at the request of *Cornelius Scipio* and *Fabius Maximus*, touching the Families of the *Cornelii* and *Fabii*, and also of the *Emilii*: Than which Books, nothing can be more pleasant to them that have the desire of the knowledge of eminent men. Also I believe he had skill in Poetry, lest he should be wanting in the sweetness thereof: For he declared in Verse what persons exceeded others of the *Roman* people in honour and amplitude of great Exploits; so that under the Statues of every person he wrote in no more than four or five verses their Exploits and Magistracies (which is scarce to be believed) that so great things should be so briefly declared. There was also another Book of his in
Greek.

Greek of the Consulate of *Cicero*. Hitherto these things were published by us, *Atticus* living. Now because Fortune was pleased that we should survive him, we will prosecute the rest; and as much as we may, we will instruct the Readers by examples of things, as we have above declared, that every mans manners procure to him his Fortune; for he being content with the Equestrial Order, wherein he was born, arrived to the affinity of *Julius*, the Emperors Son, whose acquaintance he formerly gained by no other thing than the handsomness of his Life; whereby he won to himself other Princes of an equal Dignity and lower Fortune: For so great a prosperity followed *Caesar*, that Fortune denied him nothing which she had before given or bestowed upon any, whereunto any Citizen of *Rome* could possibly attain. Now there was born to *Atticus*, a Neece of *Agrippa*, to whom he had married his Virgin-Daughter: her being scarce a year old: *Caesar* espoused
to

too *Tiberius Claudius Nero* his Son in-Law, born of *Drusilla*; which conjunction confirmed their friendship, and rendred their familiar intercourse the more frequent; although before these Espousals, not only when he was absent from the City, he never sent Letters to any of his Relations; but he sent *Atticus* word what he did, and principally what he read, and in what places, and how long he was to stay; but also when he was in the City, and by reason of his infinite business, enjoyed *Atticus* oftentimes less than he desired; yet no day almost passed, wherein he did not write to him, wherein he did not enquire of him somewhat touching Antiquity; sometimes he propounded to him some Poetical Question, sometimes merrily jesting, he drew out from him Letters of length: Whereby it came to pass, that the Temple of *Jupiter Feretrius*, built in the Capitol by *Romulus*, by length of time and neglect, becoming uncovered, was fallen down, that by the

the perswasion of *Atticus*, *Cesar* took order for rebuilding it: Neither being absent, was he less complemented by Letters from *Anthony*, insomuch that while he was in exile, he acquainted *Atticus* what was done in the Land of his Exile, what he did, and what he cared for: What a kind of matter this was, he will easily esteem that can judge of how great wisdom it was to retain the use and good will of them between whom there was not only a mutual emulation of matters of greatest moment, but between whom so great detraction of either from other, did intervene, as was necessarily to be between *Cesar* and *Anthony*, while each desired to be the Prince, not only of *Rome*, but of the whole world. In this manner when he had compleated 77 years of his life, and to the extremity of his old Age had increased no less in Dignity than in Favour and Fortune (for he gain'd great possessions, by no other means than his goodness; and had enjoyed so great

great a prosperity of health, that for thirty years he wanted no Physick) he got a Disease, which himself and his Physicians at first despised; for at first they thought it a *Tenesmus*, whereunto speedy and easie Medicines were propounded.

Under this Disease he continued three Months without any pain, but what he received from the endeavour of his Cure. Suddenly so great a violence of the Disease broke in upon one of his Intestines, that at the latter end a putrid *Fistula* broke out through his Loyns. And before this happened, after that he felt his pains daily to encrease, and that a Fever came upon him, he commanded his Son-in-Law *Agrippa* to be sent for to him, and with him *P. Cornelius Balbus*, and *Sextus Peduceus*. As soon as he saw they were come, leaning upon his elbow, he said, There is no need for me in many words to declare how great care and diligence I have used in the preservation of my health, since I have you the witnesses of it. And because

cause I hope I have satisfied you that I have omitted nothing which might belong to my recovery; it remaines, that I should now advise my self: I would not have you ignorant of this thing, for I am purposed to cease to nourish any disease: For these many dayes whatsoever meat I have taken, I have thereby so lengthened out my life, that I have increased my pains without any hope of health: Therefore first I desire of you, that you do approve of my purpose; and next, that you do not vainly endeavour to diswade me. This Speech being uttered with so great settledness of speech and countenance, that he seemed not to depart from life, but out of one house into another: But when *Agrippa* weeping and kissing him, did pray and beseech him that he would not hasten that to himself, which Nature would compel, and because he might then live somewhat longer, that he should reserve himself as long as he might to himself and his Friends, he stopt his intreaties

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 33

treaties by a silent obstinacy: So when he had forborn Meat two dayes, his Fever suddenly left him; and his Disease seemed more easie, yet he continued his purpose. In the fifth day therefore after he had taken this resolution, *prid. Calend. Aprilis*, C. Domitius and C. Sossius being Consuls, he died. He was raised up in his Bed, as he commanded, without any Funeral Pomp; all good men, and a great Concourse of the Common People accompanying him: He was buried near the *Via Appia* at the fifth Stone from the City in the Monument of *Q. Cæcilius* his Unkle.

CHAP. I.

A Brief Chronological Account of the Life of Atticus.

SUCH was the Life and Death of this worthy *Pomponius Atticus*, described by one that was Contemporary

porary with him, and well acquainted with him, namely, *Cornelius Nepos*, who, as himself witnesseth, wrote this History about the beginning of *Augustus*, that every circumstance thereof deserves a distinct observation.

And therefore I shall proceed to do these things: First to give a *Chronological Account* of the Life of *Atticus*, and of those great occurrences that hapned in the *Roman* State within the compass of his Life. Secondly, To give some account of the reason of those great motions that hapned in this period in the State and Commonwealth of *Rome*. Thirdly, To make some Observations touching the honest and wise Methods that *Atticus* used to preserve himself and his Estate without loss or dishonour among all these great motions, revolutions and dangers that hapned in the State of *Rome* by these Civil Dissentions.

Touching the first of these, I shall give a short *Chronological Account* of the Life of *Atticus*, and those great Disturbances and Civil Wars that hapned

hapned in *Rome* during the time of his Life, that so it may appear what they were when they happened, and the various successes they had, whereby at once it may appear what difficulties and storms hapned in his time, and how they were by this mans prudence weathered in the several periods of his Life. And herein I shall be but brief, and mention only those of great moment, and such wherein this mans concernment principally lay; omitting many, which though had they been single, might have been worth the remembring; yet they were but branches of these greater commotions, and sprang from them, and were but small in comparison of them.

Neither shall I be over curious in this Accompt, but only mention them so far as they conduce to my purpose. He that lists to take a full view of all the History, may find at large in the *Roman Histories*, especially, *Florus*, *Paterculus*, *Dion. Cassius* and *Plutarchus* in the Lives of *Marius*, *Sylla*, *Sertorius*, *Pompey*, *Cæsar*, *Anthony*,

and *Octavius*, afterwards *Augustus Caesar*.

I shall dispose of the Times in their order, according as they fall in the *Julian* Period, because of the difference among Chronologers touching the Computations of the years of the world, of the building of *Rome*, or of the *Olympiades* into which these Occurrences might be otherwise aptly enough disposed.

POMPONIUS ATTICUS died in the 77th year of his Age, *C. Domitius* and *C. Sossius* being Consuls, as *Cornelius Nepos* tells us, which was in the 12th year of *Augustus*, the next year before the *Pugna Actiaca* between *Augustus* and *Marcus Antonius*, and 2 years before the taking of *Alexandria* by *Augustus*, which was the fatal and funeral deletion of *Antony*. The death therefore of *Pomponius Atticus* was in or very near the 4683 year of the *Julian* period, and by this means we come to find out the several periods of his Birth, and other the occurrences that hapned to him and the State of *Rome* within the time of his Life.

If

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 37

If therefore we subduct the years of *Atticus* his Age, namely, 77 years, current out of 4683 years, it gives us the time of his Birth, viz. about the year 4606 of the *Julian* period, in or near the Consulate of *Sulpitius Galba* and *Marcus Scamrus*.

Marius that great Commander and popular Citizen, whom we shall have occasion often to mention, grew into his great power and authority by countenancing the popular Interest at *Rome*, against the Senate and the Optimates. He laid the foundation of all those future storms in the State of *Rome*, which were the occasion of so much blood-shed, and the final Ruine of the ancient Government thereof, and setting up that Empire that began in *Julius Caesar*, and was compleated in *Augustus*, his Heir and Successor. The sixth Consulate of *Marius* happened in the year of the *Julian* period 4614, at which time *Pomponius* was about eight years old.

And now the Civil Wars in *Rome*
D 3 began

began to break out; the Process whereof were as followeth.

~~~~~  
4614 ~~~~~  
In the sixth Consulate of *Marius*, by the help of *Saturninus*, Tribune of the people, *Metellus Nonus Dicus* was banished; this caused ill Blood in *Rome*.

~~~~~  
4616 ~~~~~
For within two years after, by the solicitation of *Quintus Metellus* his Father, *Metellus* was by the people recalled out of banishment, which was so great an eye-sore to *Marius*, that he withdrew himself from *Rome*, and went into *Cappadocia*.

After this *Marius* returned to *Rome*, when *Lucius Cornelius Sylla*, a valiant man, was in great esteem, a friend to the Senate and the Nobility, a man that had been very successful in suppressing the War of the Confederates of *Italy* against *Rome*.

~~~~~  
4626 ~~~~~  
Between *Marius* and *Sylla*, there grew great animosities and emulation, which at length broke out in open violence.

lence. For *Sylla* was chosen by the Nobility and Senate (to whom he was greatly addicted) to prosecute the War against *Mithridates*; and in pursuance thereof, took his journey with his Army. In his pursuit of this War, he took *Athens* by long siege; where he was often before his final return to *Rome*; where he met with *Pomponius Atticus*, and shewed him the respects mentioned in his Life.

*Marius*, to carry on his own Designs, and to root out *Sylla*, falls in with the common people, and by the help of *Sulpitius*, a bold and turbulent Tribune, gets the Province of *Asia*, and the management of the War against *Mithridates*, to be decreed to himself.

But the Army being constant to *Sylla*, would not submit to the Government of *Marius*. Whereupon, *Marius* put divers of the Friends of *Sylla* to death, and made a great alteration in the State of *Rome*.

~~~~~  
 4626 Upon this Insolence of *Ma-*
 4627 *rius*, things running into a
 ~~~~~ popular confusion under the  
 conduct of *Marinus* and *Sulpi-*  
*tius*, the Nobility gave ad-  
 vice thereof to *Sylla*: Whereupon,  
 he sent *Murena* his Legate, with the  
 greatest part of his Army to prose-  
 cute the War against *Mithridates*,  
 and takes the rest with him, and re-  
 turns to *Rome*.

Against him *Sulpitius* and *Marinus*  
 make opposition; but *Sylla* prevailed:  
*Sulpitius* is slain, and *Marinus* flying, is  
 by Edict banished, and fled into *A-*  
*frica*, whither his Son, young *Marinus*,  
 the School-fellow of *Atticus*, fled to  
 his Father.

This is that *Sulpitius* mentioned in  
 the Life of *Atticus*, who being thus  
 slain, *Atticus* seeing the State of *Rome*  
 to grow troublesome and unsafe, all  
 persons of Note being drawn into the  
 one party or the other, took his jour-  
 ney to *Athens*; he was then, as it seems,  
 about twenty years old.

*Sylla*

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 41

*Sylla* intending to make all things as sure as he might, used extream severity against *Marius's* Party, killing some, and banishing others; and having settled his business at *Rome*, proceeded in his Expedition against *Mithridates*.

~~~~~  
4627. C. *Octavius* and *Cornelius Cynna* are made Consuls; *Cynna*, though he had made firm promise upon his Entry into his Consulate, to adhere to *Sylla's* Party, yet he was (in truth) of *Marius's* Party, and quickly discovered it after *Sylla's* departure.

~~~~~  
Hereupon there grew dissention between the two Consuls, and great slaughters and proscriptions used in *Rome*, according as either party prevailed. At length *Octavius* prevailed, and *Cynna* was banished.

*Cynna*, after his banishment, went into *Africa*, and met with his Friend *Marius*, in an obscure condition; where they enter into new Counsels, which created future disturbances: For the *Marian* Faction was not so suppressed by

by *Sylla*, but that they had sufficient power to give new trouble to the State of *Rome*, if they had but *Marius* or *Cynna* to head them. Thereupon *Marius* and *Cynna* return into *Italy*, raise a sufficient force of their Friends and Party, enter into *Rome*, subdue *Octavius*, and slew him.

And now again the Party of *Marius* and *Cynna* grew as high as ever; and it is incredible what slaughters they made in *Rome* of such as opposed them, or such as they but suspected not to be true and cordial to them.

In the very same year of *Marius's* return, *Marius* takes  
 4627. his seventh Consulate; *Cynna*  
 4628. being his Colleague; and  
 they held up their Faction  
 for about four years following, with great severity against all they suspected not to be cordial to them, with Murder and Banishment: So that most of the Nobility that escaped their Fury, fled to *Sylla*, and solicited

ted his return to relieve their oppressed Country.

In the Consulate of *Scipio* and *Norbanus Flaccus*, being 463 I. the third Consulate after *Marius* his seventh Consulate, *Sylla* having settled his business of *Mithridates*, returns with a great Army into *Italy*, subdued the two Consuls *Scipio* and *Flaccus*.

But the Party of *Marius* (who, as it seems, was slain in this Battel, or as others say, died) kept still the City of *Rome*; young *Marius*, the Son of *Marius*, and *C. Carbo* are there made Consuls, and exercised extream cruelty at *Rome*, towards those that were suspected to be of *Sylla's* Party.

Against *Rome Sylla* draws his Army, and soon subdued and slew these two Consuls, and took the City, where he was created *Dictator*; and again used all manner of severity against those of the *Marian* Party: He lived about four years after he recovered *Rome*, and died in the Consulate of *Lepidus* and *Catullus*. And

And these were the Vicissitudes of the Factions of *Marius* and *Sylla*, and their Parties: First *Marius* prevailed, then *Sylla*; then *Marius* again, and then *Sylla* again; and then the Faction of *Marius* seemed wholly suppressed; yet the root of this evil dissention was not utterly extirpated; but out of it there arose the seeds of all those Civil Wars that happened in the *Roman Commonwealth*, till the final change of the Government thereof in *Octavius Caesar*. For all the Troubles and Changes that hapned afterwards between *Caesar* and *Pompey*, between *Brutus* and *Anthony*, between *Anthony* and *Augustus*, did spring from those Parties and Factions, whose foundations were laid in *Marius* and *Sylla*.

And now things being for the time settled by the severe Government of *Sylla*, it seems that shortly after the Death of *Sylla*, *Pomponius* returned from *Athens*, being about thirty years old, and brought with him a very great accession of Learning, Reputation and Honour, and the Sirname  
of



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 45

of *Atticus*, and lived in *Rome* till his Death.

When *Atticus* was near sixty years old, those mutual Emulations and Jealousies that had long fomented, began to break out into a more pub-

lick Breach; namely, presently after the Consulate of *Marcellus* and *Lentulus*, about the year of the *Julian* period,

4665. Presently after this Consulate, *Julius Caesar* being absent in the War committed to him, made suit to be chosen Consul; *Pompey* being of great power and interest, especially with the Nobility and Senate, opposed it, as a thing unusual for any to be chosen Consul being absent: Though this were his pretence, yet the true reason was, his suspicion of the growing Greatness of *Caesar*. By this means, *Caesar* was disappointed, and others chosen Consuls.

*Caesar* being enraged with this disappointment, and judging that worse was like to ensue by *Pompey* and his Party, drew the Army under his Com-

Command into *Italy*; came to *Brundisium*, where *Pompey* was but escaped by flight; thence he led his Army to *Rome*; from whence the Senate were also fled: There he made himself Consul, broke open the publick Treasury, and wanted nothing but the name of being Monarch or Emperor; though he kept up the shell and the form of their former Government. After this, he so closely persecuted *Pompey*, that in the Battel of *Pharsalia*, and some other ensuing Battles, the Forces and Power of *Pompey* were totally broken, and *Pompey* himself basely slain by *Septimius*.

4671. *Caesar* continued his Greatness for about five years; and in the fifth year, *Caesar* and *Anthony* being Consuls, *Caesar* was basely murdered by *Brutus* and his Complices, in the Senate-house; this was in the year of the *Julian* period 4671, which was about the sixty fourth year of the Life of *Atticus*.

This Villany was committed partly  
to

to prevent the growing power of *Cesar*, whereby they feared his affectation of the Empire, and change of the Government, and partly upon the score of *Pompey* (for his Assassins were most of his Party) and in revenge of his Fall.

*Cesar* by his Will left *Octavius* his Sisters Son, his adopted Heir, who thereupon, soon took the Sirname of *Cesar*.



After the death of *Julius Cesar*, there happened a strange complicated Faction in *Rome*: First, between the Murderers of *Cesar* and the *Pompeian* Party, of the one part, and the *Casarean* Party, *Anthony* and *Octavius*, of the other part. And then between *Anthony* of the one part, and *Octavius* of the other part; for *Anthony* being great and powerful, and finding that *Octavius* was the declared Heir of *Julius Cesar*, thought himself neglected, and began to envy *Octavius*, who not being above nineteen years old, began to grow great in the Army and City, being a man full of worth, and looked upon as one  
that

that might probably and reasonably succeed his Uncle in all his Greatness, especially being declared his adopted Heir.

And hence it came to pass, that both *Octavius* and *Anthony* so far agreed as much as they could, to suppress the party of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and other the Assassins of *Cæsar*, and yet kept a jealous eye one over the other.

But on the one side, the Senate and People of *Rome* had a great respect and honour for *Brutus* and *Cassius*, as being the pretended Champions for the *Roman* Liberty: On the other side, *Anthony* and *Octavius* had great Relations and great Interest in the *Roman* Armies.

The Senate therefore willing to divide the Interests of *Anthony* and *Octavius*, and discerning some animosity between them; as they kept up the repute of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, so they courted and complemented *Octavius*, and withal at the same time made *Octavius* Pro-pretor, and *Anthony* declared

4671.  declared a publick Enemy: This was done in the year of the Julian period 4671.  *Hirsius* and *Pausa* being Consuls; and the prosecution of the war against *Anthony*, was, in name at least, committed to *Octavius*, though still *Brutus* and *Cassius* were the persons principally trusted.

The War against *Anthony* succeeded well, and the *Pompeyan* party and Senate having now obtained their ends in the honour they did to *Octavius*, namely, the dividing him from *Anthony*, and thereby strengthening themselves, and weakning their Opponents, in the same year began to give evidence of their publick neglect of *Octavius*: And having now served their own turns by him against *Anthony*, declared their publick dislike and jealousy of *Octavius*, *Cassius*, *Brutus*, and the *Pompeyan* party were the great Favorites of the Senate.

In the same year *Lepidus* Master of the Horse to *Octavius*, having received *Anthony*, a declared enemy, was also

E

by

the Senate declared an Enemy to the Commonwealth of *Rome*: So that now *Octavius*, though not a declared Enemy, yet began to be either suspected or neglected; and *Anthony* and *Lepidus* declared enemies.

This was that time mentioned in the Life of *Atticus*, wherein the condition of *Anthony* was esteemed desperate, and he invaded by his Friends as well as his Enemies; when yet *Atticus* stood by his Relations, and protected them against injuries.

The Case thus standing with these three great men, *Anthony* and *Lepidus* solicited *Octavius* to fall in with them, otherwise he might look for the same ill success from the Senate that they had themselves found; and that as now he began to be neglected, so in a short time he would be oppressed by the *Pompeyan* party. Hereupon in the same year, *Octavius*, *Anthony* and *Lepidus* entred into a confederacy, to establish in themselves a *Triumvirate* to last for five years with Consular power, and the disposal of Provinces amongst

mong themselves, as they thought good.

This being thus agreed between them, before the same was known to the Senate, *Octavius* being willing to have a fair occasion to break with the Senate, demanded a kindness, which he was sure they would refuse, namely, the Consulate; where in he was rejected, and so had a fair occasion to fall off from them, who formerly and now had so much neglected and affronted him.

Thereupon, *Octavius*, *Antony* and *Lepidus* joyned their Forces, declared their purpose to reform the Commonwealth under the *Triumvirate* of them three, and march with their full power to *Rome*; which they enter and obtain; and in pursuance of their former counsel and purpose, dispose of Provinces, create Consuls, some of those that opposed them, they proscribed, others they killed; amongst whom, was *Marcus Tullius Cicero*, the great Friend of *Antony*, and the bitter Enemy of *Antony*.

This was that season wherein *Atticus* being now about 66 years old, began to fear proscription at least; but was delivered from that fear by the clemency of *Anthony*, namely, in the year of the *Julian* period 4671.

*Cassius* and *Brutus*, that were formerly designed to manage the War against *Anthony*, accordingly pursued the same against the *Triumviri*.

But they were overthrown at the Battel of *Philippi*, where *Brutus* was slain, and now the *Triumviri* held the entire government of the *Roman* Empire, all Opponents being cut off or disabled.

Shortly after, by the imprudence of *Fulvia* the Wife of *Anthony*, a difference was raised between *Octavius* and *Anthony*; but that was soon composed by a division of the *Roman* Empire between them, the Eastern part assigned to *Anthony*, and the Western to *Octavius*: and they entred triumphantly into *Rome*, and ratified their agreement by new alliance; *Anthony* marrying the Sister of *Octavius*.

In



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 53

4676. In the 4676 year of the *Julian* Period, the five years appointed to their *Triumvirate*, expired, and they prorogued their power for other five years.

In the year following, *Sextus Pompeius* being overthrown by *Octavius*, *Lepidus* began to arrogate the honour of that Victory, and began openly to oppose his Colleague *Octavius*; but his Army forsaking him, he resigned up his Office of *Triumvir*, and upon his submission and importunity, *Octavius* pardoned his Life, but exiled him. And now there were only *Antonius* and *Octavius* in the exercise of that *Triumviral* power.

In the same year, *Octavius* being 28 years old, returned to *Rome* in Triumph, where the Senate decreed unto him the Honour and Office of perpetual *Tribunus Populi*.

4682. About the beginning of the year of the *Julian* period 4682, *Enobarbus* & *Sosius* Consuls (w<sup>h</sup> was the year wherein *Atticus* died) new differences began to arise

E 3 between

between *Antonius* and *Octavius*. The Consuls and part of the Senate fly to *Anthony*, who in testimony of his defiance of *Octavius*, repudiates his wife *Octavia*, the Sister of *Octavius*; and open war was declared between *Octavius* and *Antonius*. This ended the next year in the Victory of *Octavius* against *Antonius* at *Actium*, and shortly after in the taking of *Alexandria* by *Octavius*, and the death of *Antonius* and *Cleopatra* the *Egyptian Queen*.

Thus was *Octavius* now settled in the Empire of *Rome*, honoured by the Senate with the Style of *Augustus* and *Imperator*; namely, in his fifth Consulate, and in the year of the *Julian* period 4685.

And thus we have a short account of the State and Seasons of those great Motions and Civil Wars that happened in the *Roman Commonwealth* during the Life of *Atticus*. Unto all which we must add these ensuing Considerations, which will much evidence the greatness of those confusions

cussions and difficulties that accompanied these various revolutions, namely,

1. There were not any of these Changes effected without very great and bloody Wars between the several Heads of these Factions, and their Parties, the changes were not easie or familiar transitions from one Faction to another; but they were effected for the most part by great and formidable Armies and Battels, and effusion of Blood.

2. These Battels that were preliminary to the Victory of either party, were not slight velitations and conflicts, but they were carried on with greater vehemency, violence, fury, and blood than many of their wars with Foreigners; each party engaging as many to their Faction as they could; and each party carried on with this expectation to be the possessor of the others Honours and Wealth, if they prevailed, and being assured of utter ruine from the prevailing party, if conquered by them.

3. The success of these Battels, was alwayes with greatest ruine of the subdued party that the Victory could inflict.

It is truly noted by the *Florentine* Polititian, that the *Romans* when Victors over their neighbouring Nations, never used mediocrity or a mean towards those they conquered; but either used so great beneficence or favour towards the conquered, that they thereby obliged them from a future revolt; or else dealt so severely with them, that they utterly disabled them from it. But though in the victory over the Foreigners, the *Romans*, according to the various temper of those they conquered, used sometimes the one Extream, sometimes the other; yet in those Victories that happened between the *Romans* themselves in their Civil Wars, as they never used mediocrity, so they never used the former extream, but alwayes the latter; omitting no severity that might render the subdued party in all probability,  
un-

# POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 57

uncapable of ever making head again: And this they evidenced in their bloody slaughters, that they made, after their Victories obtained, Confiscations and Proscriptions were their greatest animadversions, not only upon such as had been opposites, but also upon such as they suspected not to be their real Friends. If any were that had stood neutral, and assisted neither party, for the most part his wealth became his Crime, and rendred him obnoxious to Confiscation or Banishment, or at least to excessive Mulcts and Penalties, to help to gratifie and reward the Souldiers and Assistants of the Victor, and to strengthen and oblige his Party. Indeed *Octav. Augustus*, when he had subdued *Antonius*, was moderate towards the subdued party, and he had reason, because he then obtain'd the full mastery of all parties, and made them his own; and besides his own nature rendred him generally benigne and favourable to such of his enemies who were not implacable. But in these  
 revo-

revolutions of Successes between *Marius* and *Sylla*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Brunus* and *Antonius*, their severities were horrid and violent, in so much, that the very Friends and Relations of the depressed party, though they never acted any thing against the Victor; yet to secure themselves against the rage and jealousy of the prevailing faction, became the Persecutors and Betrayers of those that were subdued, as is before declared in the Life of *Atticus*: Upon all which Considerations it seems little less than a Miracle, that *Atticus*, a rich and wealthy and honourable Citizen of great acquaintance and relations of great esteem should live in the midst of all these flames and storms, and for the most time in that great City which was the Stage on which the greatest and severest part of those bloody and terrible Tragedies were in earnest acted, and yet retain his Wealth, Honour and Innocence, and an awful esteem and respect from all parties. But of this and the several honest  
me-

methods whereby he preserved himself, his Wealth and Honour together with his Innocence and esteem, more shall be said in its due place: In the mean time, I shall in the next Chapter make a short digression to shew the nature and reasons of these great Factions in the *Roman Empire*.

---

CHAP. II.

*Touching Factions in general, and the reasons of these great Factions in the Roman Empire, and why they happened more at this time than for many hundreds of years before.*

THE *Roman State* in its first Institution, seemed to be principally Monarchical, yet ended with a Senate, consisting at first of one hundred, and afterwards of three hundred

dred persons, called *Patres* or *Patricii* : After the expulsion of their Kings, they fell into a Commonwealth; consisting of their Senate, and two Consuls yearly elected, who had a power in some things Regal. Afterwards, there growing Contests between the Consuls and *Patricii* of the one part, and the rest of the People of the other part, the constitution of their Commonwealth was much altered by the admission of a popular power of the Tribunes elected by the people; so that now their Commonwealth begun to be mixed, partly of an *Aristocracy*, residing in the Senate; and somewhat analogical to a qualified and elective Monarchy, residing in the Consuls; and somewhat of a *Democracy*, residing in the *Tribunitia potestas*, in the Tribunes elective by the people.

Thus this mixed Republick grew great and powerful, and continued many years in great strength and peace, only sometimes there arose jars and contests between the power  
of



of the Senate and People, which nevertheless seldom broke out into wars, but sometimes by the prudent intervention of some wise Senators, in credit among the people; sometimes by seasonable concessions from the Senate to them; sometimes by the occurrence of some foreign war, these differences were often allay'd or diverted without any great detriment to the Publick.

But *Marinus* being a rough, fierce and bold person, a man of Wit and Courage, a good Souldier, successful, ambitious, and that could not endure any Opponent or Rival, began that Fire in the Commonwealth of *Rome*, that scarce ever left burning, till the Commonwealth of *Rome* was at last necessarily resolved into the Monarchy of *Augustus*. And all those Civil Discords and Wars, all those Rapines and Violences, those Murders and Banishments, that in the space of about fifty years after the sixth Consulship of *Marinus*, filled the City and Empire of *Rome*, were the success of that Faction that he began, and of that

that Breach that he first made in the Texture and Contignation of that goodly structure of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, and the *Preludin* to the Monarchy of *Augustus*, as the only Cure thereof.

Now in as much as the frame of the *Roman* Commonwealth consisted of the Consuls, the Senate, and the Tribunes, and had so stood for many years; and though in all that time, there had been men of Spirit, and ambitious enough to trouble a State, and there wanted not frequent brawls between the Nobility and Commonalty of *Rome*, in all this time, which might have as well given opportunity to troublesome Spirits, and to have given fire to the Ambition and Discontents of persons, and thereby have raised Civil Wars, and put the State of *Rome* into blood. It will be reasonable for us to enquire what the reason might be why that Commonwealth was no sooner engaged in Civil Wars; or if at any time, some such thing happened (as some such there

there sometimes were, though not so great or dangerous) they were soon extinguished, and things quickly reduced into a peaceable state; and yet in the time of *Marinus* such a Civil War begun as never left the Commonwealth of *Rome*, till it had in a great measure changed its Government: And how it came to pass that the Factions in *Rome* were so deeply radicated that the Commonwealth could not be cured of it, till it grew into an Empire, under the Government of *Augustus Caesar*.

But before I come to the discussion of that enquiry, it will be convenient, for the application of what follows in this Discourse, to premise something touching Factions in general; what they are, and what are so truly denominated.

And I must premise, that the established Government of Kingdoms, States or Commonwealths are of various frames and constitutions; and those things may be lawful according to the constitution of one State, which

which are neither lawful or tolerable according to the constitution of another State.

And therefore what I am about to say concerning Factions in a State, must be understood with relation to that or the like State or Government whereof I write, *viz.* the State of *Rome*, as it stood in those times when these troubles broke out: And this I mention to prevent misapplication and mis-interpretation of what I am writing.

By a Faction in a Commonwealth, I do not mean that Government, which is by Law or custom settled, and therefore where the settled Government is Monarchical, I do not take the adhering to the King, a Faction; or where the Government is Aristocratical, or by a Senate, as it was sometimes in *Rome*, or mixt, partly Aristocratical, and partly popular; as it was after the setting of the *Tribunitia Potestas*; that established Government, or the adherence to it, was no Faction; but it is so far from it, that  
the

the adherence to the Government legally established, whether it be Monarchical, Aristocratical, Democratical, or mixed, is the duty of every good Subject and Citizen.

But that which I call a Faction in a State, is one of these ensuing kinds.

1. When a party of men shall conspire and unite themselves against the established Government, to subvert or alter it; and this is the greatest Faction, *Crimen lese Majestatis*.

2. When a party of men shall unite and confederate themselves together, to gain either something to themselves, or to others, by force or fraud, against the will and consent of that Power that by Laws is intrusted with the concession or denial thereof.

3. When any person entrusted by the Sovereign power, with a particular Power or Authority, shall endeavour by force or fraud to extend that power wherewith he is entrusted, beyond the bounds of it; as if in the

State of Rome the Tribunes should by stirring up the People, or by force or secret confederacy, encroach upon the power of the Senate or Consuls, or *à converso*: For though by the constitution of the Government, they were invested with a just and real power, yet when by violence or fraud they encroach a larger power, this encroachment is an act done by them as private persons, and without the bounds and limits of their Authority, and therefore in such an Enterprize, they are no more excused from a Faction by their Authority that they had, than if they were without any such Authority; because they herein act beyond the bounds, and without the warrant of that Authority, and consequently as private persons.

4. When two or more great and eminent persons or parties, and it may be of a considerable interest in a State or Government, engage one against another, at first, it may be, privately, and as opportunity grows, it may be, more openly and visibly crossing

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 67

crossing each other, accusing publickly each other, each party soliciting others to be of their party: At length using discriminations of denominations, or habits or signs, and possibly in a little time, publick affronts and rencounters: And at last, it may be, open hostility, and all this while, the true real Governors of that State, whether Monarch or Senate, sit still and look on it, may be, out of fear of being oppressed by the power of both or either party; it may be out of respect to some of the heads of either party, it may be out of policy, to suffer either party to worry and weaken, and ruine one another; hoping thereby to preserve the Government; or it may be, out of a weak and tame, and inconsiderate opinion, contenting themselves with the name or external face, title and ensigns of Government, and the professed respects of either party; but not daring to interpose any acts of real authority, to suppress or remedy those growing mischiefs; fear-

ing they should not be able to carry it through in respect of the potency of parties: and so the true Governors stand by, and look on, contenting themselves with the complements and profession of subjection by both parties; till at last one party getting the better of the other, layes by the disguise of pretended Subjection, and gives the Law to his lawful Governors, and makes them do what he pleases, or suffer what it inflicts. And this commonly is the mischief that attends a Government that out of any the beforementioned respects, suffer Factions to grow so great, that at last they become Masterless, and either by conjunction of both parties, or prevalence of one, give the Law to their lawful Governors.

5. When some particular persons that are or are not in any authority in a State or Commonwealth, design some matter either for themselves, or against any other; and to effect that design, do by secret means or power, or fraud, or otherwise, draw over



## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 69

ver the power of that State wherein they live, to be their Engines and Instruments under the countenance and signature of their authority, to effect their Design.

For though the authority of the State is engaged therein, yet that being obtained by the force, fraud or other Engine, and to serve the particular interest or end of a party, and not acting according to the true and native freedom and integrity of their Institution, excuseth not this from being really a Faction, though sometimes it be speciously guilded over with the countenance of publick authority: For instance; Suppose *Marius* and *Sylla*, two great leading men in *Rome*, had a jealousy and animosity one against the other, and *Marius* desires that *Sylla* be deprived of the Province allotted to him, and that it be conferred on him: On the other side, perchance *Sylla* hath the like design against *Marius*; *Marius* solicits by Bribes or Menaces as many of the Senate as he can prevail with, to

take his part, and *Sylla* doth the like for his part: The Senate is near divided: *Sylla* procures some of the Senators of *Marius's* part, to be sent away about some other employments, and thereby *Marius* is over-voted, and deprived of his Province; then *Marius* makes in with the Tribunes, solicits the people to be of his party, and a tumult is thereby raised in the behalf of *Marius*, and thereby, and by those Friends of *Marius* that are of the Senate, the former Decree is repealed, and then *Marius* is restored to his own Province, and also obtains *Sylla's* Province.

The next day, *Sylla*, who is potent in the Army, complains of the wrong done him, and engageth the Army for him; whereby again both Tribunes and Senate are over-powered; and the Senators of *Marius's* part, withdraw themselves for fear of the Army, and now *Sylla* carries it both with the Tribunes and Senate, and re-obtains his own and *Marius's* province, and perchance *Marius* sent in-  
to

## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 71

to exile, though here be the concurrence of the Governors in these vicissitudes,

Yet these are nevertheless but several Factions. And this was most commonly the Discipline of the several Factions of *Rome*; or if they that could get to have more interest or power with the people, or with the Army, or could make the more bold and daring part of the Senate, though less in number, to over-rule the greater part, or if they were excessively loved, or excessively feared, or were subtle and crafty, to fit either the People or the Senate to their Designs, these were sure to have a countenance of Authority quickly for what they did, so that in the vicissitudes of Factions, and of their prevalence, they never wanted a *senatusconsultum*, or a *plebiscitum* to warrant whatsoever they did. And in the mean time, the favourers of the adverse party, for fear, or by-ends, withdrawing themselves from the Senate or Assemblies; and then the

others did what they pleased in favour of their own Party. And when it came to the turn of the other party to be uppermost, the same method was commonly held; the friends of the depressed withdrawing themselves, or sitting silent, or changing their Suffrages, and then all went smoothly the other way: Whereby it came to pass, that as *Sylla* at his return, wanted not the Decree of the Senate to justify all his Murders and Proscriptions; so *Marinus* at his return, wanted not the like for his Murders and Proscriptions of the party of *Sylla*; and the same vicissitudes obtained between *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Brutus* and *Antonius*, *Antonius* and *Octavius*; and for the most part, the Factions of *Rome*, whereof I have written, were of this latter kind, and managed under the shadow and umbrage of the Civil Authority, though in their original they arose from the pride and ambition, envy and emulations, jealousies and designs, disgusts and animosities of particular persons, who could  
not

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 73

not brook any whom they suspected might be Rivals of their Greatness, Honour or Power. And these prevailing, bore down the Magistracy of *Rome* before them; and yet sooner or later grounded all their exorbitances under the stamp, signature and countenance of the Authority of the established Governors.

Now though it may be true that these Decrees of the Authority established by Law, though by this means obtained; are binding, while they stand in force; yet the manner of obtaining such Decrees by these and the like means, are unjust and factious, and in true intrinsic justice, do not excuse or justify the obtainers thereof from oppression and injustice, though they may possibly, for the time, be temporary projections of them, when they continue unrepeated or unavoided.

Now a few words touching the second, namely, the Reasons why these Civil Wars broke out more abundantly and violently at this time than formerly. It

It is true, that the very Constitution and Make of such a Government as *Rome* had, being partly Aristocratical, and partly Popular, and with some shadow of Monarchical Power in the Consuls, renders such a State very powerful in relation to foreign Undertakings and Wars; for foreign Engagements do concenter and unite a people, and the Fabrick of such a State renders their power united against a foreign power, and consequently more forcible, formidable, and for the most part successful; the weight of the whole Body moving together in such foreign Enterprizes: But on the other side, these Forms of Governments have this Disease natural to them, that they are unquiet, and full of Factions among themselves, especially when they have no foreign diversions.

Great Bodies, they move slowly; yet move they must; and if the Mill have not Corn to grind, the upper and nether Millstone will grind each other. If we should suppose the supream Government

verament had been only Aristocrati-  
cal, by a Senate, consisting of three  
hundred persons, Reason and Expe-  
rience shews that Factions are apt to  
rise even in such a Council: Much  
more when the common people were  
sharers also in the Government.

For first, Commonly in such great  
Assemblies, some particular persons  
are the leading men, who think them-  
selves intitled by their parts, or repu-  
tation, or interest, to govern the Coun-  
cils, and that raiseth envy and emula-  
tions in others, who think they have  
as much reason to sway in supream  
Councils as others; which presently  
engageth that Council in parties and  
Factions.

Again, 2. It is commonly seen in  
such numerous Councils, where they  
are supream and absolute, some there  
are that drive on their particular in-  
terests, offices and advancement of  
their Families and Relations, and be-  
cause others among them, have the  
same designs for themselves, which  
must needs cross and disappoint one  
another,

another, every one gathers and engageth as many as they can, to carry on their own designs; which presently engageth either the whole Council, or very considerable numbers thereof into Parties and Factions: Upon these, and many the like emergencies, where the supreme Government rests in many, it is hardly possible to avoid breaking themselves into Parties or Factions; unless some one supream Governour be to check and controul, and disperse these Factions; or unless some foreign emergency happen, that may concenter them in a common union against a common Enemy: But besides all this, the mixture of the *Roman* Governors, consisting partly of the *Patricii*, Optimates or Nobility, and partly of the People and their Tribunes, who were their Delegates, between which the Sovereign power was in many things distributed and divided, did still administer occasion of contest and difference, and gave opportunity to busie and unquiet and discontented spirits,



to interests themselves with the Senate against the people; or *è converso*: but especially with the popular party, and by secret suggestions or insinuations, or by open Declamations or Orations to create disturbances in the State; a co-ordinate power in several parties, Councils or Offices rarely resting quiet till some one person or party hath gotten the mastery of the rest; as appears among many instances in that of the *Roman Triumvirate* of *Octavius*, *Antonius* and *Lepidus*; wherein, first *Lepidus*, and then *Antonius* were reduced into the single power of *Octavius*, together with the Empire: And besides the Constitution of their Commonwealth, partly consisting in the authority of their Consuls, partly in the Senate, partly in the people and their Tribunes, there was yet a fourth fountain of continual commotions; namely, their standing Army: If any of the Consuls, that were annually chosen, was of a tumultuous or of ambitious nature, and it may be of too great a Spirit for his

his Companion, or not willing to be dispossessed of his power at his years end, and his present power in the Army, gave him opportunity to satisfy his ambition: If a man were of a great wit, interest and elocution, he had a great opportunity of leading the Senate, or the greater number of them, whither he pleased, unless he had some Antagonist of equal wit, interest and elocution, and then their collision begat emulation and contrary Factions. Again, a man that was bold and confident, and a great assertor of Liberty, that could make plausible Invectives against the Senate or Nobility, and could cry up the interest of the people, that could find faults with the administrations of the Senate, or could set up some popular Law (as that of the *Lex Agraria*, which bred so many tumults in that State) such a man had an admirable opportunity to work Tumults and Factions among the people: Again, if a man that were an Officer in the Army (as the Consuls, the *Magister Equitum*

*Equitum* was) and were esteemed a gallant man, a man of courage, resolution and conduct in the Army, a man successful and fortunate, liberal, and of a good presence and elocution, such a man had a great power and influence over the Army, could lead them as he pleased, make what alterations, innovations he pleased by them in the Commonwealth; so that the State of *Rome*, as they could not live without a standing Army, considering their Military condition, so they were in danger by them, if they had the least intermission from foreign Wars; that their Magistrates, Senate, People, Army, were as so many common places, and topiques, in or from which, men of unquiet, ambitious and turbulent spirits, had opportunities to create or nourish Factions and Parties, which must necessarily in time, either by their mutual collisions, or the prevailing success of either, make great changes, or strange Earthquakes and Concussions in the State.

Certainly

Certainly the *Roman* Senate were a noble Council, without which *Rome* could never have risen to that grandeur; yet they being supreme and numerous, could never be long free from Factions: much less when the Tribunes of the people, and the great Officers of the Army had such a share in the Government.

But these are but Generals; there seem certain special reasons that occasioned these great and continuing Factions and Civil Broyls in the State of *Rome* at this time; besides that general habitude and propensity to Factions, arising from the Frame and Constitution of their Governors, when they had no Foreign Enemies, which seem to be principally these.

1. The Commonwealth of *Rome* about that time, and shortly after that under *Sylla*, after their Victory over the Confederates of *Italy*, had gotten the Mastery of all their neighbouring Nations, that they seemed to have little left for them to do in Military Engagements, and there-

therefore being a busie, active people, they were still restless, and for want of enemies abroad, they were (by the restlessness of their active souls, accustomed to Wars) carried on to exercise their fervour and fire one among another: And the wiser part of the Council easily found that this would be the necessary consequence of their peace with others; and therefore although they had subdued all their near neighbours, and had little necessity of any foreign wars, yet they sought occasions for the diversion of this unquiet humour, by sending abroad their Armies to remote countries, as *Gallia* and *Britain*, and *Spain*, and the farther parts of *Asia*, in their unnecessary War against *Mithridates*; using that means to keep things quiet at home, by employing their fiery, active spirits in remote actions, dealing by their Armies, and military, ambitious men, as they say, Conjurers do with the Unquiet Spirits that they have raised, set them about some impossible or difficult employment, as, filling a Sieve with

G

with water, or making a Rope of Sand, that they may not do mischief. So the *Roman* Councils, to keep restless, ambitious and troublesome persons in motion and action, though they had many times little need or reason for it, rather sought enemies at a distance, or made them such, that they might divert by revulsion those other inconveniences that otherwise they might find from them at home. But now when these great Broyls fell out, namely, after the 6<sup>th</sup> Confederacy of *Marius*, they had in effect, subdued all Opponents; and although *Sylla* was employed then in the War against *Mithridates*, yet he did but play with it, and protracted the War, which he at his pleasure, could have sooner concluded; as appears by the peace he made with him at last. This seems therefore the first reason of the eruption of these intestine Wars at this time; because the *Roman* power had mastered all their neighbouring Nations, and reduced them into a perfect subjection,

jection, or into such a kind of association with them, as still left the *Roman* State the Supream over them. And these Wars they then had, were not such as were necessary, nor near, but such as were at a distance, and undertaken either politickly, for the end above declared, or at least ambitiously, and to augment their Grandeur, not out of any other necessity.

2. The second cause or reason seems to be this; they at first gave too much head, and too much power to ambitious and intemperate spirits; which thereupon radicated a Faction, and habituated great spirits to the same. *Marius* was a high-spirited, and factious man, and the Commonwealth indulged him too much, and too often in great Commands and great Offices. He was six times chosen Consul, and once he made himself so; and by this means, he accustomed and habituated many of the Grandees of *Rome* to the knack, and practice and skill of managing a Faction,

ction; and when *Sylla* was set up a-  
 gainst him, he grew a great Favou-  
 rite; trusted with great power, of-  
 tentimes made Consul, and at last  
 Dictator; and under his Discipline,  
 those of his party got the trick of  
 managing a Faction, and tasted the  
 sweetness of power, and could never  
 be perfectly weaned from it: the like  
 might be instanced in *Pompey*, *Caesar*,  
*Antonius*, *Brutus*, *Octavius*, &c. For  
 these men were lifted up so high by  
 the great and over-long trust, and  
 power, and offices, and commands  
 that were committed to them, that  
 in a little time they grew too big for  
 the Commonwealth; and although  
 the Senate and People bore the name  
 of a Commonwealth, yet in truth  
 they were but Ciphers, and did no  
 more than what these great men,  
 while they were in power, and had  
 the Army at their command, did ei-  
 ther command, or direct, or permit.  
 And these great Commanders and  
 Officers, though they pretended an  
 inferiority to the Commonwealth,  
 and



and that they were but their servants, yet in truth, those were but Compliments; for in their several vicissitudes of power, they exercised as great and greater Monarchical, or rather Tyrannical power than ever *Octavius* did after he was saluted by the name and style of *Augustus*. And by this means the generality of great Spirits in *Rome*, were taught to despise the former regular Conduct of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, and aspired after greater matters, initiated and lifted themselves under Factions, learned the art and skill of them; designed to themselves as much greatness as they had seen acquired by those Grantees to whom they had joyned themselves, and were not patient of being any longer under the Commands of the Senate, but were filled with spirits, and habits and designs, not consistent with a Commonwealth, and accordingly as opportunity happened, they broke out into new intestine commotions; whereas the former Discipline of the Commonwealth

of Rome was not to make men too great, or if necessity exacted it of them, as when they created Dictators; in time of desperate danger or necessity, they continued it not longer than the necessity lasted: By this means men were not very long in great power or offices, and thereby were kept from growing too great.

Factions growing by them, or under their umbrage, had not time enough to ferment or take root, or grow strong, but a substitution of new men in office and power, soon suppressed, or scattered, or starved the budding Factions before they grew too masterless. And men that were naturally high-spirited, or ambitious, or fond of power or greatness, had thereby discouragement or interruption in their projects, and the generality tutored into obedience and quietness, having no examples of successful Factions: And by this great moderation and restraint of too great or too long power in any, they prevented

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 87

prevented that envy and animosity, which is naturally apt to rise against men in a Commonwealth, that are grown too great or too powerful: But on the contrary, the course that about *Marius's* time was used in *Rome*, gave necessary occasions of the growth and turbulency of Factions by these three necessary consequents thereof.

1. He that was thus raised to too great and long a domination, was necessitated to maintain a Faction to support and keep him in that state of Grandeur to which he arrived.

2. That the accustomed Grandeur of any one person did as naturally raise envy in others against him, and consequently the raising of Faction against him to suppress or reduce him to a lower condition.

3. It suddenly instructed men in the methods of raising Factions, and accustomed men with a kind of facility and dexterity in managing of them, and invited them to the frequent use of these practices by the sweetness of power, and the success

of others that had prevailed by them.

3. The third occasion of the multiplied Factions that happened in Rome, after the Dance began by *Marius*, was that very thing which was ordinarily used for the suppressing them; namely, the violence, rage, and revenge that was used by that Faction that prevailed, against the Faction that was subdued.

For instance, When *Marius* was uppermost, he used all manner of severity against *Sylla's* party that opposed him. Again, when *Sylla* prevailed, he used the very like severity against the party of *Marius*. The like was done again by *Marius* and *Cynna*, and their party. Thus like foolish Passengers in a Boat, when the waves rowl, and the Boat tilts to one side, then run on the other, and make it tilt worse, and then run again to the other side, till they endanger the casting away of the Vessel and themselves.

Thus these great Heads of Factions,

ons, and their parties, by the violent and outrageous dealing with the depressed party, endeavouring thereby to secure and establish themselves in the free enjoyment of their acquired Victory and Greatness, and utterly to disable the adverse party ever to appear again in power, did obtain a quite contrary effect, and suddenly ruine themselves, and by their violence give life to that party they thus endeavour by these means to extinguish : And thus it must necessarily be, and in experience hath been commonly found to be; and the reasons of it are these.

I. These excessive severities do raise in the generality of mankind these two passions, which do most ordinarily bring to pass that which I have said; namely, a loathing and detestation of that cruelty and inhumanity, and of that party that practiseth it; and a pity and compassion towards their fellow-Citizens, whom they see thus cruelly handled. And that hatred doth most com-

commonly waste, and in time ruine the conquering party; and this pity doth secretly animate, assist, and buoy up the depressed party, and oftentimes give it life, when it seems extinguished and dead.

2. These excessive severities can never wholly extirpate all those that are of the adverse party; some will remain do what they can; And if they could wholly extirpate every person that ever appeared against them, yet it will be impossible to extirpate all their Relations or Acquaintance, unless they should wholly dispeople their Countrey of all but themselves. There is not a person that they murder, but it may be hath twenty others under some relation or other unto the person murdered, either as a Father, or Son, or Brother, or Kindred, or Friend, or Dependant. And the more of the adverse party they destroy, the more Relations they leave that survive them. And so many of the adverse and suppressed party as are of their relations,

# POMPONII ATTICI. 91

relations, that survive, will bear in mind the remembrance of that cruelty, and harbour a secret and violent passion of revenge against it: And this passion, as it is fierce, cruel and implacable, so it is vigilant and industrious to gain an opportunity to satisfy it self. And this was it that principally caused that Villany against *Cesar*, and the endangering of all those that adhered to him. It was not altogether the jealousy they had of the Greatness of *Cesar*, the fear of his invading the Empire; but it was the memory of *Pharsalia*, and the death of *Pompey*, and those severities which he used against that party (though he were not immoderate therein after the Battel ended.) The Love and Memory of *Pompey* and his Party that survived him in his Friends and Relations, and the spirit of revenge that they had long harboured, was that which made and united, and fortified the Conspiracy against *Cesar*. And possibly the death of *Antonius*, and the destruction of his party,

ty, by *Octavius Caesar*, might have produced as unhappy effects, had not the experience of *Octavius Caesar*, and his singular prudence and moderation, and his deserved esteem in the *Roman Empire*, conquered as well the revenge and envy of the relations of *Antonius* his party. Thus these severities of prevailing parties too often times perpetuate and unite their enemies, instead of extirpating and extinguishing them.

4. The fourth, and indeed the great cause of these Commotions at this time, and for so long a continuance, was this, States and Commonwealths have certain periods of their duration and consistency appointed them in the ordinary methods of the Divine Providence; and sometimes those periods determine in a final desolation or excision: Thus the Commonwealth of *Carthage* was finally destroyed by the *Roman*. Sometimes this period doth not expire in a desolation, but in some great change and alteration of it: And if the Com-  
pages



pages and Fabrick of the Commonwealth be strange and foreign, the change is more difficult; it hath a long and great struggling before that change can be effected; and preparatory to the effecting thereof, there are ordinarily great aspiring attempts endeavoured by great Spirits; concussions and shakings antecedent and preliminary to it, as if the very complection and temperature of the great and more regnant spirits in it, were tending to some such change. And thus it fared with the State of *Rome* at this time; the period of its former Aristocratical and popular Government was within sixty years of its end, and a new and better shape of Government to be assumed. And now all the great and active spirits in *Rome*, seem to be reaching after a Monarchical or Imperial Government; as first, *Marius*, then *Sylla*, then *Pompey*, then *Cesar*, then *Antonius*, then *Augustus*;. And although all these were not able to acquire the full accomplishment of it, yet every one of these

these drew nearer to Imperial power, than the other; *Sylla's* power grew greater than *Marinus's*; *Pompey's* than *Sylla's*; *Caesar's* than *Pompey's*; till at last it fixed and was completed in *Octavius Augustus*.

And all these were so many indications that now at this time the Genius of the *Roman* Republick, or rather more truly, the Genius, the disposition, temperament and complection of the *Roman* State was drawing towards, and breathing after a Monarchy, as that which was now the most suitable Government for it; and that these several Earthquakes, raised by these fiery spirits, were but as so many stroaks of a skilful Statuary, to bring the *Roman* Commonwealth into the more stately Statue and Configuration of an Imperial Government; which seemed now not only to be the complement and perfect growth and stature of the *Roman* State, but that which was absolutely necessary to preserve it from ruine by Civil dissentions, and to preserve

serve its Grandeur; so that as the state and condition of the natural Body arrives from a more imperfect degree, to a more perfect, and passeth through various changes, till its complement and perfection; and then gradually declines: so the *Roman* State passed through these various forms, which in its several seasons were suitable to it, till it came to this goodly and compleat station whereunto it attained under *Augustus*. And these various concussions and shakings that it had in those sixty years before *Augustus*, were but the preparatory endeavors, and struglings, and tendencies of the Spirit and Genius of the *Roman* State, that tended to it, and the strokes and hammerings that were necessary for its effecting: And therefore this was the periodical season for these attempts and preparations to a change. And thus far (by the way) of the Reasons that might probably occasion these Civil Broyles in the *Roman* Commonwealth at this season more than formerly.

## CHAP. III.

Concerning the Methods that ordinarily persons use to secure themselves in the Vicissitudes of prevailing Factions.

**W**E have found *Rome* in the whole compass of the Life of *Pomponius*, to be a Theatre of great and tragical commotions, full of unquietness and danger, and of various vicissitudes; sometimes one Faction prevailing, and sometimes the contrary Faction being uppermost; and then again the former returning; whereby the Scene was oftentimes varied. And now I shall briefly consider of those Methods that commonly persons use, and in that season did use for their security and safety, and the errors and ineffectualness thereof, to the ends here proposed, that thereby the prudence and wisdom of *Atticus*, and the singular discretion of those means

means which he used for his own security, may the more clearly appear. The means that ordinarily men choose in such unquiet States, are for the most part such as these.

i. They commonly strike in with that Party or Faction that is in present power, and joyn with it, and commit their Fortunes into the same Vessel with it; the imprudence whereof, is apparent in this, that they venture all in the constancy of the success of that Party or Faction which they espouse.

And consequently, if they prevail not, or happen to receive at any time a shock, they are ruined with them, or at least escape that ruine with infinite difficulties. And herein is apparent their want of due consideration of the state of things of this nature. They judge according to the present face, and shew, and appearance, and do not consider that truth which Reason and Experience makes evident and common; namely, that Factions in a State never long hold  
H their

their ground. But if they are not suppressed by the natural power of the State wherein they arise, yet by the same like means whereby at any time they obtain, they are commonly broken and dissolved, and by the same Artifices whereby they gain the Saddle, they are commonly unhorsed, either by the adverse party, or by some distemper rising in their own Party, which is equally michievous to them. The Game being ordinarily thus managed, that when one Faction hath suppressed another, the victorious Party fall into divisions among themselves; some thinking they have too small a share in the acquest, and others too much, and so weaken their Party, and render it less and narrower; and then commonly one of the subdivided party, that finds it self weakest, falls in with the remainders and Reliques of the first party, and so oppresses that subdivided party that last obtained, whereby it comes to pass, that if the person that fell in at first with

with the prevailing party, takes that subdivided party that seems prevalent, he suffers ruine with them; and if it be his Lot to fall in again with the weaker subdivided party, and so joyn with the old suppressed party, yet his former oppression is remembred, and he is never trusted; and commonly as the old party gets advantage and power, he is exposed to Infamy, Contempt or loss. But be the success what it will be, he is ever in an uncertain, unstable and tumultuous condition, and still put upon necessities of new Devices, Shifts and Contrivances to save the State; whereby he never can enjoy true tranquillity either of Life or Mind.

2. Another Expedient that men use to save themselves, is, ever to be of the prevailing Faction by all Methods and Artifices imaginable, and as the parties change in their successes, so to fall to them or from them: And herein they have a difficult and troublesome Game to play; and they had need be their Crafts-Master, if at the first

change they are not at a loss, but if they keep their ground upon the first change, they never can weather the second; for they irrecoverably lose their Credit; their tricks and shuffling and disposition will be known, and then they will be like Stratagems in War, that can never be practised twice with any success; at least, by and between the same parties. And now these Artifices wherein men thus save themselves, are commonly Flattery and Dissimulation, Pretensions of their being formerly mis-led, and now their eyes are opened, professions of great satisfaction with the proceedings of the party prevailing, and extream indignation against that party which they formerly took; suing for opportunities to manifest their indignation against them, and hatred of them; and to gain credit with their new Masters, and give a testimony of their through conversion to them, offering their service, and employing it in the bitterest persecutions, treacheries and cruelties against those that  
they



they formerly served. It is observed in the Life of *Atticus*, that when *Antonius* was declared an Enemy, and *Brutus* and *Cassius* obtained in *Rome*, there were none more bitter persecutors of *Antony's* Family, than those that in his prosperity had been his Friends: But the folly of these Sycophants and followers of Fortune, appears in this:

1. That though possibly they may save their skins by such tricks, yet they never gain credit enough with their new Friends to be either loved or trusted: They may use them for their ends, but always secretly hate and detest them, as men of base dispositions and principles, and ever suspect them, as such as would do the like with their new Friends upon any turn of Fortune.

2. Their new Friends, if they employ them at all, employ them in the basest Offices, and such as are commonly, though perchance useful to their occasions, yet hateful and detestable to Humane Nature; as to be As-

assinates, Spies, Betrayers of those that were of the former party, and such sordid employments: And they dare not boggle or scruple at such employments, nor perform them perfunctorily or ineffectually; for then they are rendered obnoxious to their new Masters, and commonly suffer worse than if they had never complied. And if they go through with these base employments, they are rendered odious to all good men; and if ever the adverse party gain ground again, they are sure to be ruined: Thus they purchase their peace with their new Masters at the dearest price, and become everlasting slaves to save their Skins and Estates.

3. The third Mischief that they are involved in, is this, that if ever the former Faction prevail again, they are sure to be dealt with worse than the worst of enemies, and can never save themselves by new flatteries and tergiversations: Nay, if it fall out (as commonly it doth) that this last prevailing Faction breaks and subdivides  
into

into Factions, and one part falls in with the old Faction, to strengthen themselves, and carry this Sycophant along with them; yet the remaines of the old Faction will never forget this mans revolt; but one time or other, will work his ruine, unless his Fortune be better than either his Wisdom or Desert.

3. Another, and the most ordinary help is upon the prevalence of the adverse party, men that are obnoxious to them, purchase their peace, if they be rich and able: But this is not without danger too; for such a man shall rarely sit quiet under the party with whom he so compounded; but they will ever find some device to be alwayes draining of Money from him; partly because their necessities will be still calling; and partly that they may disable him from giving new supplies to the adverse party, if ever they should appear again. And if ever such a Turn happen, he shall be sure his old Friends will expect a greater contribution from him, and

make him pay á double Ransom; (if he be able) to expiate his former composition with their Enemies, and will pretend it a piece of Justice, to set the higher Mulct upon him.

These are some of those ordinary Helps whereby men use to secure themselves under the Vicissitudes of Factions: But these were not such as were used by *Atticus*; they were quite of another kind, and such as were more Noble, Prudent and Safe; - as shall be seen when we come to consider them.

---

CHAP. IV.

*Touching the Means whereby the Safety of Atticus was procured under these various Vicissitudes in the Roman State.*

**T**He History of this Mans Life gives us the Relation of these things.

1. It gives us a short and obscure Account of those Storms and Civil Wars of *Rome*, whereof I have given an Account somewhat more particularly in the first and second Chapters.

2. It gives us an Account how that notwithstanding all these storms, this man enjoyed a quiet and serene Life, and a peaceable Death, after he had lived 77 years.

3. It shews also the Means which he used for the attaining of this Tranquillity of Estate, among all those

those troublesome Contests and Difficulties.

4. It also tells us of the excellent Learning, Virtue, Goodness, Liberality, Frugality, Constancy, and other Excellencies of this excellent man.

Touching the first of these, I have said enough before: Touching the second, I shall say but little; because the History of his Life fully relates it. He always in these times lived in great peace; quietness and tranquillity.

2. In great wealth and plenty. 3. In great esteem and reverence with the Nobility and Common People of Rome.

4. In great value and esteem with all parties; no Faction, though never so prevalent or violent, did him any hurt; but studied and endeavoured all wayes imaginable to oblige him; insomuch that in his old age, his Daughter was married into the Family of *Augustus Caesar*. 5. Which is yet more, he kept a fair and open, visible correspondence with all contesting parties, even in the times when their differences and animosities were highest, and yet without

out any distaste or jealousy, by either party; all parties courting and honouring and esteeming him in their greatest heats, and contests, and civil wars one against another. Indeed upon the return of *Anthony* to *Rome*, this good man began to be somewhat afraid of Proscription; this fear attacked him by reason partly of his old Age, which naturally is more obnoxious to Fear, than younger Age; and partly by reason of that extremity and violence used against *Cicero* his intimate Friend: But it soon appeared that he was more afraid than he had cause; for *Antonius* did not only give him an assurance of his own safety, but at his intercession, spared many more, that had otherwise been obnoxious to the danger of this revolution. In short, he lived as happy and as honourable a life as could possibly be expected in the most serene and quiet times.

Touching the fourth of these, namely, the Virtues of this excellent man, I have occasion to mention them in the  
next

next Chapter. And the Business of all the following Discourse shall be principally employed in the third General; namely, the Means and Methods whereby this excellent man was preserved in the midst of these Civil Flames and Storms. And next under the Divine Providence (which secretly and powerfully ordereth and governeth all things and events in the world) I think the preservation of this excellent man, may be attributed in the first place, to the Virtue and Prudence of *Atticus* himself; and secondly, to the Temper and Constitution of the Affairs of *Rome* at this time, and of the Nobility and Citizens thereof.

And because my great Design in all this Discourse is to trace out those excellencies, and that prudent Conduct of *Atticus* herein. I reserve the first of these to the full enquiry of the ensuing Chapters, and shall take up the second Consideration, which as it was the least of the Conducibles

to



to his preservation; so it shall be but briefly handled.

There seems to be in the condition of Affairs and Citizens of *Rome*, these two Expedients, that, though to an ordinary person, they might be of little use in these Calamities; yet to a man of that eminent worth and goodness, and desert that was in this man, might be some assistance to his own prudent conduct of affairs in relation to his safety and preservation.

First, The experience that the *Roman* State had gained of the mutability of things before such time as *Atticus* returned to *Rome*, from *Athens*: For he went to *Athens* about the time of *Sylla's* first return to *Rome* against *Marius*, he returned not till after *Sylla's* Death, as it seems, And though that after his return, the Factions and Vicissitudes thereof in *Rome*, were great; yet I think scarce any History gives an account of so great Troubles, and Vicissitudes, and Changes in so short a time; and between two single Heads of Factions;

as

as happened between *Marius* and *Sylla*: And this instability and vicissitude of things gave a Lesson to ensuing Factions, of some more moderation than appeared between those two parties of *Marius* and *Sylla*; and therefore it seems that in Contests between *Cesar* and *Pompey*, there was somewhat more of moderation, than was between *Sylla* and *Marius*. But this was soon forgotten (I must confess) for the assassination of *Cesar* by *Pompey's* party, soon made both parties forget moderation, as appears by the cruelty of *Antonius* against *Cicero* and divers others at his return to *Rome*.

This was something conducive to the quiet of *Atticus*, namely, the experience that all parties had of the vicissitude of Fortune, taught them somewhat more of Moderation than formerly; and men engaged in Factions, were contented to keep an interest in so good and worthy a man as *Atticus*; though he took not part with them, because they knew not  
how

how soon they might stand in need of his Friendship, either to relieve their distressed condition, or to intercede for them.

2. A second Consideration relating to the Great men, and chief Officers, and Citizens of *Rome* was this, that long and great experience had given them a great observation and judgment of men and their dispositions and worth. *Athens* indeed was then the greatest School in the world, for the attaining of the knowledge of Learning and Arts; but there was no School in the world equal to *Rome*, for the knowledge of men. For they had the best opportunity to have the experience of this kind by their frequent converse with men of all dispositions, inclinations, employments, and Nations, both in the resort of Foreign Agents thither, and in their own Negotiations and Expeditions abroad, and the great variety of occasions, and actions, and occurrences of several natures. These opportunities taught, especially the Grandees

Cookman

dees of *Rome*, admirably well to understand men as well as business.

And they found that *Atticus* was not only a very learned, wise and excellent man (this indeed had not been sufficient to have protected him no more than it did *Cicero*) but that he was a man of great esteem, and well beloved by the Citizens generally, and a man that really and sincerely declined any intermeddling with any Faction, did not stand in the way of that Honour and Grandeur that ambitious men looked after; that he was contented with his Station, affected not Power nor Wealth, that his beneficence was great to all, and not out of contemplation or study of parties, but as a friend to Humane Nature and Mankind in general. And upon this account, they found that it was not at all their interest, neither did the necessity of their Affairs engage the Victorious Faction to bend themselves against him; nay they well knew it would have been a disreputation to their Cause, to have oppressed

oppressed a man of that credit and  
 innocence that *Atticus* was of. And  
 besides, they found, that as the state  
 of all affairs was so mutable, that  
 sometimes one party, sometimes ano-  
 ther was uppermost, so he was a com-  
 mon Magazine and Treasury of good-  
 ness and beneficence to the necessi-  
 ties and exigences of Mankind, though  
 he industriously declined cherishing or  
 encouraging their Factions and Ani-  
 mosities. And they prudently foresaw  
 a possibility of the change of their own  
 condition, wherein they might stand  
 in need of his Beneficence hereafter;  
 and therefore not only out of Justice,  
 in contemplation of his Innocence, but  
 out of Prudence, in contemplation of  
 the mutability of things, and the use  
 they might have of his relief and be-  
 neficence upon a change of Affairs,  
 they did not only not oppress or in-  
 jure him; but they endeavoured by  
 all offices of kindness and respect, to  
 oblige him. And hence it was, that  
 although the great Heads of Factions,  
 when they prevailed, were severe to

all that oppressed them, and jealous of all that were not of their party, were ready to receive occasions against them, and enriched themselves, and gratified their Assistants with the spoils of all such as they suspected: Yet they would receive no accusation against him, and generously did bear with the reliefs he gave to their Enemies in distress, and interpreted it not as an adhering to the adverse Faction, but to be, as indeed it was, the fruit of his natural beneficence and goodness to Mankind, as such. And therefore they were not of such narrow and pitiful souls, to give ear to busie Informers or Sycophants against a man of his worth and goodness, as one that strictly sided with the adverse party, or that his beneficence towards men in distress was an owning or espousing of their Follies and Factions: For they understood and knew the man to be wise, and just, and peaceable, though liberal and compassionate to those that wanted. And this was another occasion of his safety,

ty, namely, the prudence and generosity of those great men, who, though by reason of their Self-Love, Interest, Ambition, Affectation of Power, and Greatness of Spirit, and emulation, could brook no Opponent or Rival in their Greatness; yet had so much wisdom as to know men; and so much generosity and nobleness of mind, as to value and esteem such a one who was really a common Friend and Benefactor to Humane Nature. And these be some of those foreign and accidental contributions to his preservation: But all these are but little and inconsiderable. The great foundation of his safety (next under the Divine Goodness and Providence) were his own Worth, Virtue, Goodness, Prudence and wise Conduct of himself and his actions, whereby he became, as the Author of his Life observes, *sua ipsius Fortune Opifex*, one that moulded and shaped his own success and happiness through the whole course of his Life.

And this is the business and design

of the ensuing Discourse, namely, to shew those excellent, wise and honest Methods whereby he served the great superintendent Providence of the Governour of the World, in his own preservation and steering of his Life in peace and happiness through all the Storms and Tempests of that troubled State of *Rome*, till he arrived at his rest in a good old Age. And this Argument I shall prosecute at large in the ensuing Chapters, as the principal end of this Discourse. 1. Because it may give a more distinct account of the admirable Prudence and Wisdom of this excellent man. 2. Because it will give a singular example, and possibly a useful instruction how a man may preserve at once himself and his innocence and tranquillity in difficult and tumultuous times; and steer himself between the Rocks of contesting Factions without Shipwrack.



CHAP. V.

*Touching the Means that Pomponius Atticus used to save himself from the dangers of the Civil Wars that happened in Rome : And first, concerning the Quality and Condition of the Man himself.*

**T**HE Means that this excellent man used for his preservation, were not of those low and despicable kinds that are before mentioned in the Third Chapter ; but they were such as are honest and generous, justifiable and rational ; such as consisted with innocence, worth and prudence, and accordingly proved singularly successful, as well to preserve his Reputation, as his Safety.

And I shall digest them under these three Heads, *viz.*

- I. What he was, and how the

qualifications and condition of his person conduced to this end.

2. What he principally avoided.

3. What he principally did in order to this attainment. And in all these, I shall follow that faithful Description of him and his Life, by his Contemporary *Cornelius Nepos*; though I shall perchance order and transpose the several circumstances and passages in it, in some different order from that Description, singling out, and laying together the same under various Heads or Sections.

For the first of these; what he was: He was a man of deserved veneration and esteem where-ever he lived; and that esteem obtained not by a bare, light, popular eye; but raised upon the firmest and most deserving accounts, arising in or from himself, or those accessions or contributions that were of great vicinity to himself; so that he had a kind of intrinsic propriety in the reputation he had; because it was but the natural

ral reflection of what was his own: and not from the Donatives, or Charity or liberality of others. By this means his honour and esteem became fixed, stable and permanent.

1. Though he were not of a *Patrician* Race, yet he was of a generous Extraction and Family, derived to him by a long succession of Progenitors of the *Equestrian* Degree.

2. He had a fair Estate descended to him from his Father, which was encreased by the accession he had from his Uncle; and this he encreased, not by great Offices, or Military Rapine, Farming of Customs, or by Merchandize, or by any Mechanical employments, but by a prudent and generous Frugality, favouring neither of parsimony, nor profuseness.

3. He was educated in all sorts of Learning, first in *Rome*, and after at *Athens*, the University of *Greece*, and of the world.

4. He had persons of great eminency and Learning, that were the companions of his Education.

5. He made a great proficiency in all kinds of Learning, as *Greek* Oratory, Poetry, Antiquities and Philosophy; in all which he exceeded his Contemporaries.

6. He was a man of exquisite parts, of a great Wit, profound Judgment, admirable Elocution, singular Wisdom and Prudence.

7. All these he improved by use and experience in matters of publick concernment, whereof he was a great observer; and though he would not meddle as a publick Officer; yet he much assisted the Commonwealth of *Athens* with his private advice and assistance in the businesses of the Commonwealth; and after his return to *Rome*, he was looked upon as a very wise man in State-Affairs; inso-much, that if he would have engaged himself in publick Councils, he had been able probably at any time to have weighed more than any one man, the publick Counsels and Actions of that State.

8. He was a man of great Truth,  
Vera-

Veracity and Sincerity, that hated Lying and Flattery.

9. He was a man of singular Prudence in his Domestick Affairs, frugal without Parsimony or Prodigality, his House and Furniture neat and handsom, without Sumptuousness, his Family great, but orderly; his entertainments plentiful, without superfluity.

10. He had a great prospect into the Affairs both private and publick, and could at a distance foresee the events of things. *Tully*, that was a wise man, consulted him as his Oracle; and had he followed the Counsels or Example of *Atticus*, he had escaped the violence of *Anthony*.

11. He was a man of a large heart, liberal, bountiful, compassionate to those in want, distress, or necessity, and yet placed his bounty with that wisdom, that he avoided the suspicion of Popularity, and the danger of countenancing Factions or Parties; and this he did by these two methods, he did what he did in this kind, openly

ly and generously, not sneakingly, as if he was ashamed or afraid of what he did; and he did it indifferently, and without discrimination of parties.

12. He was a man of great affability and chearfulness, and yet mingled with such authority and gravity, that as by the former he gained Love, so by the latter he upheld his Respect and Reverence; that as my Author tells us, it was hard to judge whether he was more feared, or revered, or loved. He conversed with the meanest with a handsome condescension, and yet lost nothing of his awe and due distance; and he corresponded with the greatest without adulation or flattery; with the meanest, without superciliousness or insolence.

These are some of those many qualifications of this man, that rendered him acceptable to all, beloved of all, revered and esteemed by all; so that none would or durst do him hurt: all courted his Friendship and Familiarity.

liarity. And by that excellent humanity and goodness, and suitableness of disposition to the true *Genius* of Humane Nature, he obtained a secret interest and party, as it were, in every man; for although most of mankind be transported either with passion, or ambition, or self-love, or interest, whereby they are carried out to many unruly and disorderly actions, yet there is in every man a secret *Genius* of Humanity, a secret by-  
 as towards Virtue and Goodness, that a man can never so far forth put off and discharge himself from, but that he will still retain an approbation of Virtue and Goodness, a secret esteem of it, and of them that practise and use it; though mens Passions and Errors and Incogitancy may carry them off from the practice of it themselves, so that the common by-  
 as and secret sympathy of the humane Nature in all men with Virtue, Goodness and Honesty, gives an honest and a worthy man interest almost in the worst of men, whereby they are before they  
 are

are aware, inclined to love, reverence and honour him, whom yet their passions and interest many times forbid to imitate. And this goodness of *Atticus* was that which gave unto him a secret interest and party, as it were, in those rough, great and ambitious Commanders and Officers, and all others of the *Roman* Empire, that they durst not injure him, but loved, honoured and admired him as a man framed according to the true Standard of the Humane Nature.

And as this connatural benignity of this man was the root and fountain of all those excellent actions hereafter mentioned, which were those other Auxillaries that procured his safety, so I do look upon that native and acquired worth, virtue, goodness and congruity to humane perfection; and that deserved esteem and honour that from thence resulted unto him from the generality of men, to be one of the greatest procurers of his security in troubled times. And indeed upon the bare account of his worth,



worth, wisdom and excellence, I do look upon him as a greater man than *Sylla*, or great *Pompey*, or *Cæsar*, or *Antonius*, or *Augustus* himself: For these great men being circled about with great Armies, with Horsemen and Legions, with Swords and Pikes, and other instruments of force and cruelty, subdued and conquered Cities, and Kingdoms, and Armies, and afterwards shattered and broke one another, and with these assistances ruled the Senate, the City, the People; but this single man, without either Armies, or Military power, or external force, without any Instruments of terror, by his own personal virtue, goodness and worth, commanded the love and esteem of all, prevented injuries, conquered the Conquerors, and reduced them all successively, one after another, when they were in their greatest splendor and power, to court him, to strive to oblige him, to pay an awful reverence to him; so that he was in truth greater than the greatest of them, and better fortified and guarded

guarded against the common violences that attended those times, than either *Pompey* or *Cæsar*, in the midst of their greatest and most formidable Armies.

---

## C H A P. VI.

Concerning the other Expedients that this wise man used, to avoid the difficulties of the Times wherein he lived; and first, of his Travels into Greece.

I N the former Chapter we have seen *Pomponius Atticus* an excellent, good and virtuous man, and in great esteem by reason thereof, where-ever he lived, and the great security he had upon that account of the great reverence and veneration that all men owed and paid to him: And this was the great *Basis* both of his security and tranquillity in troubled and factious times,

times, and the root and spring of all those virtuous actions and prudent management of his Life, which together with the reverence and veneration of his worth, contributed to his safety and happiness of Life.

These actions and prudent disposals I have before distributed with relations to their Objects, into these two kinds.

1. The things which he avoided.

2. The things which he did.

1. The first Essay that he made, was to avoid the Scene of the troubled estate of *Rome*, upon a wise foresight of the ensuing commotions, and the difficulty for him, being young, rich, and in esteem, to avoid, if he staid in *Rome*, engagement in those dangerous Factions that were now hatching, and partly broken out: And for that purpose he retired with a considerable part of his personal Estate, to *Athens*. And this he did principally to avoid those growing Storms which were beginning; but yet with a fair and worthy design to  
im-

improve himself in Learning at *Athens*, which was the learnedest School in the world, and the place of resort of young Gentlemen, not only of *Greece*, but of *Rome*, and other parts of the *Roman* Empire, for their education: And the manner and occasion of this his withdrawing from *Rome*, was thus:

*Marius* became a great man in *Rome*, had been now six times Consul, a man of an active, busie, fierce and imperious Spirit, and projected great alterations in affairs to the detriment of the Senate and Nobility of *Rome*, and by his often holding the Magistracy, had gotten many active Spirits of his party, among which was *Julius Caesar*, though privately and cautiously, and many other Gentlemen of Spirit and Fortune.

*Pomponius* lived all this time in *Rome*, being bred there in the time of *Marius*'s power, and bred up with one of his Sons, and with divers Gentlemen that could not choose but be devoted to the party of *Marius*.

In

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 129

In the sixth Consulate of *Marius*, he began to be almost of mans estate, about 18 years old, the season for young Gentlemen of *Rome* to mingle themselves in publick Affairs, or to be initiated in Military Employment; and doubtless he could not choose but be solicited and importuned thereunto about that Age, and could hardly avoid it without an imputation of sluggishness and cowardize, or of being no friend to the present State of *Rome*, and the rather because he was known to be rich, and Nobly descended.

And besides all this, he was linked into affinity and acquaintance with many of the party of *Marius*, especially with *Sulpicius* the Tribune, a great Friend of *Marius*, whose Brother married his Sister.

And now the Senate and Nobility of *Rome* smarting under the power of *Marius*, and desirous to avoid his Insolence, solicited *Sylla* to return to *Rome* for their deliverance.

*Sylla* returns with his Army, and  
K being

being opposed by the power of *Marius* and *Sulpicius*, overcomes them, kills *Sulpicius*, banisheth *Marius*, and sits heavy upon the party of *Marius*, with Death, Confiscation and Banishment, as hath been before shewn.

*Pomponius* finding the business to grow warm and dangerous, and fearing the encrease of troubles, and being now about 19 or 20 years old, and having an handsom and just excuse and opportunity to go to *Athens*, to improve his Learning and Knowledge, takes the opportunity; and in the interval of the domination of *Sylla*, and possibly foreseeing a probability of the party of *Marius* to engage *Rome* in new Troubles, repairs to *Athens*, and there he staves for about eight years; and as it seems, till after the second Return and Death of *Sylla*.

And by this handsom retirement, he gains these two advantages.

1. The opportunity of his encrease in Learning.

2. The declining and avoiding the Storms

Storms at *Rome*, and the necessity of being some way unhappily engaged in one of the parties, or crushed between both; and yet the reasonableness of the former, namely, his seasonable going to *Athens* for the acquirement of Learning, according to the custom of young Gentlemen of that Age and time, fairly covered his latter design of avoiding the troublesome concerns of the *Roman* State, and was a just and reasonable excuse for his retreat thence, though there had been no other cause.

So that herein the Wisdom of this young man appears; namely,

1. In choosing such a season to retire from *Rome*, when it was not safe for a young Gentleman to remain there, unless he would vainly hazard all by engaging in a Faction.

2. In choosing such a season of his Age; namely, about twenty years; and such a place for his retirement, as was proper for his advance in Learning, and carried his apology with

it, and avoided all just cause of exception by either party.

And if any shall say it was a piece of pusillanimity for him then to retire, when his Countrey stood in need of his advice, assistance and countenance. It is easily answered, The whole City was then divided into those two Factions; if he had gone about to have appeared against both, it had been vain and ridiculous, and utterly ineffectual; he had imprudently lost his Labour, and exposed himself inevitably to be ruined by both: or either had he stood single in such opposition, every man would justly have esteemed him a Fool; and had he engaged others in such an opposition, he had ruined his Friends and participants as well as himself; which had not only been vain, but also inhumane, to have involved others in so fruitless and desperate an Enterprize. But on the other side, had he fallen in with either Faction, he must necessarily have been carried with a violent torrent of the Faction wherein he



he was engaged, either in their common opposition of his Countrey, and the Cruelties which they used against their Opponents, if they prevailed; or must needs have sunk in the calamity of that party, if they were subdued: So that his retirement in this season, was an act of great prudence; because unless he had so done, he had no pretence, considering his youth and eminence, to avoid the intanglement in one Faction, or the desperate opposition of both, if he had staid: But afterwards in that Faction between *Pompey* and *Caesar*, he being then near sixty years old, kept his Station in *Rome* without any retirement, having the fair excuse of his old Age, to apologize against engagement with either. This therefore was the first Specimen of his Prudence, his seasonable and justifiable retirement to *Athens* in his youth, when Factions grew violent, and chusing that time and place for his quiet improvement of Learning, which

he might with most opportunity and safety dedicate to that Employment.

## CHAP. VII.

*The Second Expedient that he used for his safety and preservation; his industrious avoiding of being engaged in any Faction while he lived in Rome.*

**I**Ndeed the Generality of the honest Methods of this good man to preserve himself and his tranquillity, together with his innocence, may be reduced to these two general heads; his care to avoid the making of Enemies, and his endeavours honestly to make all men his Friends: The latter will come under the consideration of what he avoided in order to his honest preservation. And under this General falls this particular consideration

sideration of avoiding Engagement in any Factions. In order thereunto, was that Expedient mentioned in the former Chapter; namely, his retirement from *Rome*.

And now I shall consider the farther prosecution thereof in relation to those importunities that were used to engage him in parties after his return to *Rome*, and even while he was in *Athens*; and shall make these Observations touching it, that may be useful in relation to it.

When *Pomponius* was at *Athens*; *Sylla* resorted to him, there presented him with Gifts, complemented him, and used all methods to endear him. And this he did for many Reasons.

First, Out of the great respect and honour that he bore to his Learning and worth; this was fair and noble, and became such a man as *Sylla* was, who was a great Lover of Learning. But this was not all.

Secondly, Therefore *Sylla* being now engaged against the party of

K 4

*Marius*,

*Marius*, and now about to return to *Rome*, upon that Design, thought that it would be an advantage to him and his proceeding, if he could but publickly possess the World with an opinion of a great familiarity and intimacy between himself and *Pomponius*, who was a person of great honour and reputation, not only at *Athens*, but at *Rome*; and the news would quickly fly thither touching the great kindness between *Sylla* and *Pomponius*, and this would quickly beget an opinion that *Pomponius* was won over to his party; that *Sylla* communicated his Counsels to him, and used his advice; and that all the courses he steered were guided by *Atticus* his Compass; and then the veneration that all persons had of *Pomponius* and his Wisdom, would give a great credit to his undertaking, when once the People of *Rome* were possessed of that great intimacy and dearness between him and *Sylla*. And besides it was well known, that although *Pomponius* would never be drawn into the party  
of

of *Marius*, or any other; yet he he had many Friends and Relations in that party; and such a report would give a great discouragement to that party: And this is no strange piece of policy. *Hannibal* when he came into *Italy*, shewed all the kindness to the Relations and Possessions of those men in *Rome*, that he most feared; thereby to possess the people with a jealousy of them, that they were of his party, or with a greater kindness to himself, that he favoured those the people honoured. And it hath been an usual trick in times of publick differences, that when Usurpers or the heads of any Factions were about any pernicious or mischievous action, they would immediately before the propagation of such businesses, send for persons of greatest reputation and credit, and possibly those that they knew to be greatly in credit with the adverse party, caress them, entertain private converse and speech with them, though perchance of some idle impertinent business;

*HP*  
*Horish*

finels; as of a Horse-Race, or Hunting-Match, and then presently after, publish, or go about some pernicious action, that the world might think to be the product of some advice from those persons whom they thus entertained. And this was another reason that *Sylla* maintained this great familiarity with *Atticus* at *Athens*; that the world might think that surely he was now of *Sylla's* party, and that they had communicated counsels each with other, for the farther advance of *Sylla's* undertakings.

3. It rested not here; *Sylla* being a great man, and having the province of *Asia* assigned to him, wherein *Athens* lay, used all these Friendships to *Atticus*, to see whether he could really draw him over unto him; and having, as he thought, prepared him with so great applications, and addreses, and familiarity, from so great a man as himself then was, thought that now it might be seasonable to perswade him to go along with him to *Rome*, and in plain terms  
to

to be of his party; but he was not only disappointed herein, but by the overacting of this part, he lost all that advantage which he might have gained by the former policy, namely, to have perswaded the world by that great intercourse between them, that Atticus was secretly at least, of his Faction. When Sylla therefore a little before his going from Athens, plainly broke his mind to Atticus, and perswaded him to go along with him to Rome, he gave him the peremptory, yet reasonable Answer: *Noli adversum eos me velle ducere cum quibus ne contra te arma ferremus Italiani reliqui*: Perswade me not to go against them, for I left Italy, that I might not bear arms with them against thee. Sylla, though he lost his Complements and Design, yet outwardly, at least, appeared satisfied with the reasonableness and justness of his Answer, gave him fair respects at his departure from Athens, and returned to Rome, where he gave another turn

of things, and quite routed the party of *Marius*.

Again, when *Pompey* was in his great power, and upon the difference between him and *Cesar*, marched against *Cesar*, with the Vote and Suffrage of the Senate and the City of *Rome*, though *Atticus* now in *Rome*, shewed him all private and friendly respect, yet he would by no means be drawn to follow *Pompey* into the Field, or to interest himself in the Concern of that Faction; but fairly excused himself by reason of his Age, being then about threescore. This *Cesar* interpreted to his advantage (though he would most certainly have given the like Answer to him, had *Cesar* had the like opportunity of the like request) yet I say *Cesar* took it kindly, and was willing, for his Credit's sake, to interpret it to his own advantage; and therefore when he returned Victor over *Pompey*, he did not only spare *Atticus* (though he staid at *Rome*) from any such thing as Proscription or Confiscation (the easiest animad-



animadversion that the Victors use upon their enemies) but excused him from that Muleſt or Fine that was impoſed upon Neuters. Yea, he did not only ſpare him from any thing of puniſhment, but uſed him with all the humanity and reſpect imaginable.

Again, when *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and their party baſely murdered *Julius Caesar* in the Senate, and *Brutus* was thereupon raiſed up, not only by the party of *Pompey*, as the *Vindex Pompeiani ſanguinis*, but by the Generality of *Rome*, as the great Patron of their Liberty; that as the firſt *Brutus* delivered them from the power of Kings, ſo the ſecond *Brutus* reſcued them from the power of a King, under the name of a *Perpetual Dictator*; and the Senate and People magnified him, as the great Aſſertor of their Liberty: I ſay, when *Brutus* rid upon this triumphant Chariot of popular Applauſes, there was a ſecret deſign on foot for the raiſing of a private Bank or Treafury for *Brutus*,  
the

the Head of this Commonwealth-party, and the design was laid that it should be done by a Subscription, and those of the *Equestrian* Order should be the first Subscribers: And the contrivers of this Advice, knowing *Atticus* to be rich, liberal, of great reputation, and therefore that his example would be of great authority: They thought to begin with him, and that his Name should be the first in the Subscription-Roll, but they were deceived: *Atticus* plainly told them, that although *Brutus* should command his Purse, as a private person, for the relief of his personal exigencies, as he had often done before; yet he would by no means meddle in such an Enterprize, which savoured so much of an engagement in a Faction, and a publick owning of a party; and thereupon the Design broke, and was no further prosecuted. And this was no small occasion of his safety and preservation, and also of his honour and esteem; when the Tide of affairs turned, and *Anthony* returned  
to

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 143

to *Rome*, victorious against *Brutus*.

And by all these and many more indications of this kind, *Atticus* made it evident to all men, that he was resolved against any engagement in any Faction; and this gave him that great security and privilege, that whensoever he relieved any of any Faction, it was not with any contemplation of their party or Faction; but as I have often said, upon the common account of respect to Humane Nature, and a certain native *Philanthropy* to Mankind in general: and again, when he resolutely denied any such action or thing as might be justly construed an espousing of a Faction, yet he was not thereby obnoxious to the indignation of that party that he so refused, he did but *solitum obtinere*, kept his custom, and did equally and impartially reject the solicitations of all parties in this kind; and hereby he stood upon his own *Basis* and bottom, kept his station, was neither engaged in any Faction, nor was he rendered thereby obnoxious to the indignation  
of

of the parties which he thus refused, though they were in power, and able to do what they pleased; because they found by experience, he did but hold his Principle, and was impartial therein, equally refusing other Factions as well as theirs.

And the Reasons that moved him to this kind of neutrality in Factions, are evident, and may be satisfactory.

First, He did it upon an account of greatest Prudence; for it was evident to him by great experience, and by a wise prospect of things, that these Factions and their successes were strangely mutable and uncertain. Our Author tells us, *Tanta varietas in temporibus fuit Fortuna, ut modò hi, modò illi in summo essent fastigio aut periculo*: The successes of Factions were so uncertain, and the vicissitudes so strange and various, that those that now prevailed, and seemed in an empregnable condition, were suddenly tumbled down; and again, those that seemed in an irrecoverable and desperate

rate ruine, regained the Government, even to a Miracle. And the Reasons are partly given in the Second Chapter; and therefore by engaging in any Faction, he was sure to undergo the common Fate which that Faction had; which was either wholly to be ruined, if the adverse party prevailed, or at best; in case the party wherein he should be engaged, prevailed, yet they were but in a tottering, uncertain, unquiet, restless condition, and were not like to hold that power or interest which they had so difficultly gotten.

Secondly, He did it upon account of common Justice and Honesty; for those Factions in the State of *Rome*, were not the true, lawful, settled Government thereof: For therein *Atticus* and all good men ought to have engaged; for it had been their duty and glory to have assisted it, and a certain baseness and pusillanimity of mind to have deserted: But those Factions in *Rome*, were such as I have before described in the Second Chap-

L

ter;

ter; certain Excreſcencies, Tumors, and Diſeaſes ariſing in the *Roman* State, by the Power, Ambition and unquiet Spirits of certain buſie men in *Rome*, that either thought their Worth neglected, or not ſufficiently rewarded, or were provoked to Animofities by mutual Jealouſies and Emulations one of another. And although it is true in the ſeveral Viſſitudes of the prevalence of any Faction, they did ſo handle the Senate and People by Artifices, and Tricks, and Threats, and Affrights, that they minted their Factions oftentimes with the ſtamp and face of the Senate and publick Authority; yet the truth was, they were really ſtill no other than Factions and Parties, which like prevalent noxious Humors, or putrefied Diſtempers in the Body, overpowered the true State and *Genius* of the Civil Government, and rendred the whole Body in Diſorder; yet it could be no more eſteemed the true complection of the *Roman* Government, than a *Fever* or *Calenture*,

*Calenture*, though it overspread the whole man, can be accounted the true and natural complexion of the man: And although the *Paroxysmes* or Fits that the *Roman* State was put into, were various, and contrary each to other, according as one or the other prevailed; like the hot Fit and the cold Fit in an Ague; yet still the Commonwealth of *Rome* was sick, and laboured under the Distemper of either Faction, which soever of them prevailed, as the Histories of those Times abundantly inform us.

And therefore all those several Factions, as they were extreemly cruel and severe unto one another, so they were all infinitely pernicious to the Commonwealth; which by the competitions of those turbulent Spirits, was torn in pieces. And therefore *Atticus* in common Justice, and upon the account of that Love he owed and bore to his Countrey, had no reason to joyn with one or other party, which were in truth, but so many *Cancers*, and *Ulcers*, and *Diseases*

of his Countrey; which though they were too strong for him to cure, yet he had no reason to assist.

I do confess that commonly all Factions, to gain themselves credit, at least make some pretence for the good of their Countrey, something that they would pretend to reform. And it may be, really there was something in the State of *Rome*, that was necessary to be reformed, and the Disorder might be so powerful, stubborn, and obstinate, that they thought it could not be done by ordinary means, and that at the first attempt might be the thing that they, or at least many of them really, and it may be, only, or at least principally aimed to set right: But *Atticus* was a wise man, and did easily see,

1. That many times Reformation was pretended, but the great Design was private Interest, or Revenge. Or,

2. If some men in the simplicity of their hearts, meant well to the State of *Rome*, that were engaged in those Factions,



Factions ; yet when once a Faction is set on foot, men that have other Designs, either of Ambition, or Covetousness, mingle in it, and commonly in a little time, become prevalent, and distort all to their private Ends and Advantages, and engage others in the like, who are fed, or do feed themselves with the like Hopes. And,

3. He well knew that in a little process of time, variety, succession, and occurrences, and new emergencies, and Counsels carry Factions quite beyond their first Designs into greater Rapine, Fury, and Cruelty and Revenge, than ever they themselves, it may be, at first thought they should ever have been guilty of.

And therefore the Experience that *Atticus* had of the prodigious Cruelties, and Bloodshed, and Rapine and Violence that former Factions had produced in *Rome*, made him peremptory against engaging in any, notwithstanding their most specious pretences and earnest importunities to

engage him; for he well knew that if he should be engaged in any, yet had it obtained the best success that they could reasonably expect, namely, Victory, and a full enjoyment and possession of the power they desired, yet the rage and exasperation of the Souldiery, the desire of revenge of those injuries the conquering party had formerly suffered, the opportunities of enriching themselves by the spoils and confiscation of the conquered, the necessity of gratifying many necessitous and indigent persons of their party, the politick endeavour to secure themselves in their new acquired power, by the death and ruine of all such whom they knew, or feared, or suspected, were, or might be their Opposites, and the striving to establish themselves against any possibility of falling under the power of those that they had injured; these, I say, and such as these, would presently engage the victorious party to exercise all cruelty and violence, confiscations and proscriptions, death and  
murder

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 151

murder upon those they hated, or feared, or injured, or suspected: And all this *Atticus* must behold, and not be able in the least degree to help; and so his first engagement into this party, though victorious, must interest him in all the villanies, and injuries, and unjustness that must be the fruit of this success.

In the first motion of Enterprizes of this nature, the pretences are commonly fair, modest, nothing pretended but reformation of abuses, and great moderation professed; and this is so carried by the Heads of Factions, partly to cover their Designs, partly to gain to themselves credit and good esteem with good men, or at least with the Vulgar, that thereby the Heads of parties may with the more ease and plausibility attain their desired success: Yea, it may be possible that the Heads of parties might in their first attempts really intend what they at first pretended. But when the success is attained, and possibly by great Bloodshed, the Gover-

nors of Factions quickly outgo the ends and designs at first propounded. New successes give new resolutions, new designs, new attempts, which before either were not discovered, or it may be, not thought on by the first undertakers in their first undertaking. And *Atticus* well knew, that if once he was engaged in the Enterprize, he must follow not only the Fortune, but also the Commands and Counsels of the party and their Governors, and so be engaged in all the Villanies and Injustice that attended their success, and so lose his innocence: Or if he should go about to declaim and protest against the unjust prosecution of their Successes, and endeavour to resist them, his endeavour might be his ruine, but at the best, could never be prevalent or successful; and the best fruit he could expect from his Engagement in the party, would be repentance too dearly bought, the loss of his Credit, if not of his Innocence, the sad spectacle of the violence and injustice of that Faction

ction wherein he thus had unhappily engaged, and a miserable deplorable disappointment in all his endeavours to reclaim it, or restrain those violences that must accompany its success; the motions of a powerful, prevailing, successful Faction, being ordinarily as ungovernable by the interposition of a private person, as the rolling of a mighty Stone from the top of a steep Hill, which will never leave rolling, till it comes to the bottom; and the longer it runs, the more violent and ungovernable is its motion.

Nay, it very often comes to pass, that a Faction in a State, if it hath any continuance, grows utterly unlike to what it first was; the Counsels and first designs must necessarily change, new men and of new principles successively come in play, which bring new Counsels in fashion and request: Nay, every variety of success changes the Counsels of them that at first presided in it, though they continue the same persons, that  
put

put on new purposes, resolutions and undertakings; so that if *Atticus* could have perswaded himself to have engaged in any Faction, he must have resolved to have kept those plausible principles which first led him to that Engagement, and then he had been quite out-run by his own party, or else he must have resolved to hold pace with his party in all their changes and practices, and then he must out-run his Innocence, his constant integrity himself. And as thus his Prudence kept him from mingling himself in Faction, by a due prospect of the ill consequences that must needs arise to him thereby; so the very habit, complexion and constitution of his mind admirably secured him against all temptations thereunto.

There is in most men a certain intemperance of passions that renders them very obnoxious to fall in with Factions; but among them there are three sorts of Passions, or rather indeed putrefactions of passions, and diseases

diseases of the Soul, namely, Ambition, or the desire of Honour, Power, Place, Preferment, Covetousness, or the desire of riches, or vindictiveness, or the desire of revenge. And if a man do but take notice of the politick managements either of the Governors of States or Kingdoms, or of particular Affairs of less note, the concerns of the world are very much carried on by setting of Handles to those distempers in men, and then they are led about and guided as men guide Puppets on a Stage, by unseen Wires or Pulleys; so that those motions which to outward appearance seem free and from themselves, yet in truth, they are in kind necessary, and managed by others, that either wisely or craftily propose but Objects to those unruly passions; and they follow them as the Needle doth the Loadstone. And this the crafty Heads of Factions make great use of; and if they find a man that is under the regiment of any of these Distempers, 'tis a thousand to one  
but

but they win him over: If he find an ambitious or a mutinous or a revengeful man, he fiddles him in the head with such instances as these; wouldst thou be great, or rich, or powerful, or revenged for some publick neglect or affront, I will shew thee a sure and compendious way of attaining thy Desires; thou shalt not need to run the long, tedious, laborious race of Virtue, to attain honour, or make thee great, nor the tedious, industrious application of thy self to some Trade or calling, to make thee rich; nor the regular motion of a judicial process, to avenge thy injuries: Fall in with us, and all the Honours, and power and Riches of *Rome* shall at one clap fall into our dispose, and thou shalt have the opportunity to be thine own avenger of thy affronts and injuries. Nay further, to say the truth, such is the Magick and Enchantment that ariseth from those intemperances of the mind, that without any solicitation from without, they carry men headlong that way they think shortest



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 157

shortest to satisfie themselves; and therefore are easily caught and entangled in a Faction, as that which promiseth the most compendious method for the attainment of their Desires.

But the Constitution and Complexion of the very Soul of *Atticus* was such, that those Distempers of Ambition, Covetousness, or Revenge, dwelt not there; and by this means he was proof against Temptations from within or from without, to side with a Faction. He was honoured and esteemed for his own Worth and Virtue, and he was not ambitious of any other accessions of Honour, Place, or Preferment.

He had a competency of Estate, decently to support himself and his Family, and relieve his Friends in necessity; and he was contented with his condition, was not desirous of more: And as he was so happy, as never to have received any such injury as might provoke revenge; so he had such a calm, serene, even frame  
of

of mind, that that passion could get no hold upon him: And he had abundantly well learned the best Lesson of the Stoical Philosophers, not to injure himself by passion or perturbation because another did him wrong; if the injuries were small, he took no notice of them; if great, he soon forgot and forgave them. And this was all the revenge he took of injuries; and to say the truth, it is an exquisite, yet innocent kind of revenge; for it makes the wrong-doer quickly sensible of his own injustice, and revenge the same upon himself by sorrow and repentance.

These and the like Considerations were obnoxious to his Experience, as well as his Reason; and therefore although he were acquainted, and possibly very familiarly, with many persons engaged in those Factions; nay, though he might see easily an apparent demonstration of their success, yet he would never engage in them himself, but avoided it as a Pest or a Plague-fore, wherein he was sure, if  
he

he were once engaged, he should lose either his Safety, or his Innocence, or both.

---

CHAP. VIII.

*The Third Expedient that Atticus used for his Safety, refusing too great kindnesses from great persons.*

THE Third Expedient which this man used for his Safety, was this; That although he was alwayes ready to oblige all men by all offices of kindnesses, yet he would never receive over-great kindnesses from great persons, especially if they were of such a kind or measure, as he might not be able probably to requite; as great or profitable Places, Offices, Honours or Donatives: And the Reasons that induced him to this abstinence and declining of such great Obliga-

Obligations, seem to be these:

1. He was a man that contented himself with his condition; which, as it was plentiful enough, so he was very well satisfied with what he enjoyed, and had neither an ambitious mind to become greater, or a covetous mind to become richer than his Father and his Unkle left him.

2. He was a modest man, and did not set so high a rate upon himself or his Merits, as to expect a tribute of beneficence from others, as the desert of his worth.

3. He was a grateful man; he was forgetful of injuries done to him, but mindful of Benefits received by him, and thankful for them, and esteemed himself still in debt, till he had made a proportionable return for kindnesses received. And therefore if the benefits were so great, that they were beyond requital, he thought himself in the condition of such men as owe more than they are able to pay; which is a troublesome and slavish condition: And such his own would have

have been, if he had been surcharged with immense Courtesies.

But 4. and principally, the reason why he declined such obligations, was, because he would retain his own liberty, and continue Master of himself and his Actions; for most commonly immense benefits received from great men, render the Receiver under a great servitude to his Benefactor, and is a great obligation for a man to think, and speak, and act as their Patron desires or expects; and certainly in a troubled State, inclinable to Factions, such kind of Obligations are pernicious to the obliged, renders them, as it were, the Clients and Vassals of their Patron, and by a kind of secret charm or enchantment, makes them servants to him; and this obstinacy of *Atticus* in these commotions of *Rome*, was a great means of his Peace, Liberty, Safety, and disengagement from parties: And therefore when *Pompey* (who was a great man, popular and beneficent) endeavoured to place great Gifts and

M Offices

Offices upon him, he warily and prudently declined them; and by that means, when *Pompey* solicited him to appear of his party against *Cæsar*, and to go with him to the wars, he was in a condition to refuse it, and accordingly excused himself from that engagement, and sat still at *Rome*, when at the same time those persons whom *Pompey* had obliged with great Offices and large Donatives, were fain to come to him, upon his Summons, and engage with him in that great contest between him and *Cæsar*, and fall with him; for although they would have been gladly excused from this undertaking, yet they durst not decline it, being under this unhappy *Dilemma*, that if *Pompey* prevailed, they should have lost his favour, and those honours and offices that they enjoyed by his bounty; if *Cæsar* prevailed, yet being persons so greatly obliged by *Pompey*, they would have been suspected and oppressed by *Cæsar*, or at least neglected by him, as persons that were really of the *Pompey*-

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 163

an Faction, though they declined the present Engagement. But howsoever their reputation would have suffered, and they would have been accounted a sort of ungrateful people, that after all such Obligations as they had received from *Pompey*, should ungratefully desert their Benefactor, when danger or difficulty appeared.

But on the other side, this prudent obstinacy of *Atticus*, fairly excused his declining of *Pompey's* Engagement, without the least imputation of ingratitude, and was yet of singular advantage to him when *Cesar* returned Victor, who highly honoured him at his return to *Rome*, and much advanced the reputation of his Prudence and Discretion, that so wisely refused such an Engagement in *Pompey's* Faction, that in the success might otherwise have ruined him; and so wisely refused all those great obligations that *Pompey* would have put upon him, that had they been received, would in all probability, have engaged him in his Faction. Thus our

Author tells us, *Nullum enim à Pompeio habebat ornamentum, ut ceteri qui per eum aut honores aut divitias ceperant; quorum partim invitissimi Castra sunt sequuti, partim summa cum ejus offensa domi remanserunt.*

And there was another reason of his modest refusal of publick Honours and Offices from those who had the power of conferring of them, and that had a favourable respect for him, for he made use of their Favours for a better and nobler end, namely, to rescue and relieve men that were, or might be oppressed, or in extremity, in the collision of Factions: This use indeed he made of their Favours as he had opportunity. And had he taken respects from them for his own advancement or wealth, those rewards and gratuities would have precluded his opportunity of intercession for others. He therefore prudently declined the collation of Bounties, Offices or Honours to himself from those that had the opportunity and will to confer them upon him, and reserved their



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 165

their respects for the good or deliverance of others, whom the uncon-  
stancy and change of Affairs rendered  
obnoxious to those that were in pre-  
sent power.

---

CHAP. VIII.

*The Fourth Expedient of Atticus  
refusing Offices and Publick Em-  
ployments in the Commonwealth, by  
the Suffrages of the Senate or  
People.*

**I** Come to the Fourth thing which  
*Atticus* industriously avoided,  
namely, Publick Offices.

Some Offices in *Rome* were in the  
power of particular persons; as prin-  
cipally, their *Legati Provinciarum*,  
Lieutenants of Provinces, which were  
in the gift of these publick Ministers,  
whether Consuls, Tribunes, or others,  
to whom the government of Pro-  
vinces

vinces were allotted. These Substitutes had very honourable and profitable employments, commanding in affairs of Peace and War in those Provinces in the absence of the chief, and also of great authority while they were present.

Other Offices were Elective or Constitutive by the Senate or People, as Consuls, Tribunes, Pretors, Ediles, Censors, &c.

In the former Chapter I have shewn his declining the reception of Offices from the hands of private persons; and now I shall shew his avoiding of such publick Offices as were of publick choice or donation.

Offices in *Rome* were rarely offered, but sought; they were beneficial and honourable employments, and wanted not Competitors; but *Atticus* was so far from seeking Offices, that he would not take them when offered, but industriously declined it: When the Citizens would have elected him Pretor, he refused it; and he made this handsome advantage thereof, that

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 167

that when his Brother-in-Law *Quintus*, being afterwards elected Pretor, and had a Province assigned him, and offered *Atticus* to be his Legate, he told him that he had formerly refused the Office that *Quintus* now had, and therefore it was not decent for him to take a substitution from him.

This therefore was *Atticus* his principle, he would do all the good Offices he could, either for particular persons, or for the Commonwealth, in the station and capacity of a private person; thus he did for the Republick of *Athens*, while he lived there; and thus he did in *Rome*: But neither in the one City nor the other, could he be drawn to undertake any publick Office or Employment.

The Reasons whereof shall be hereafter shewn.

First, Touching publick Offices and Employments in general, certainly the generality of men are strangely mistaken. It seems a wonder to

me, to see the folly and vanity of men, that so fondly hunt after great Offices and Employments: Heretofore in the State of *Greece* especially, men better understood themselves and their interest, and peace, and happiness, than voluntarily to engage themselves in Offices and great Employments, insomuch that there were then compulsory Laws to enforce men to undertake, not only inferiour and petty Offices that were of burden and charge, but greater Offices that had honour and profit annexed to them; which though they are more honourable, and more profitable, yet they are more dangerous and hazardous, And the truth is, that it hath been the skill and art of the wiser sort of mankind to annex to such great employments those Blandishments of honour, esteem and profit, to invite men to the undertaking of them; as Physicians guild their bitter Pills, that they may be the easier swallowed. The plain truth is, Offices and places of great import and trust, are necessary

fary for the good of others, and for the preservation and order of Kingdoms, States and Commonwealths, and therefore the wisdom of those Kingdoms and States is to be commended, that annex to them those Ensigns of honour and honourable supplies for their support, to invite and incourage men to undertake them; yea, and further, where those invitations will not serve to draw men of worth and ability to undertake them, those States are to be commended that enact Laws to compel such men to undertake them. But it is most certain that any man that ambitiously hunts after them, nay, that man that doth not industriously decline them, if possibly he may, understands not himself, nor his own peace, happiness or contentment; which will appear, if these things be considered.

1. A man that undertakes a publick Office or Employment, doth necessarily draw upon himself much envy; and the reason is, because the  
gene-

generality of Mankind have a good opinion of themselves, and think they deserve those Offices and Employments that others enjoy, and they think also very well of the Offices and Employments themselves, look upon them as goodly, fine gawdy businesses, and are fond of the honour and wealth that is annexed unto them, and they would fain be at them, and think those that do enjoy them, stand in their way, and therefore they envy, and malign them, and envy is a busie active humour, and restless, until it unhorse those upon whom it fastens, or break it self in the attempt.

For it is ordinarily true, whosoever possesseth that which many desire, hath as many Enemies and Enviars as he hath Rivals and Competitors; and as many Competitors as there are ambitious or covetous men in the world. And besides this, all great Offices have commonly somewhat of power annexed to them. And although Societies of men can never  
subsist

subsist in order without some power be over them, yet particular persons commonly hate and envy any power in any but themselves.

2. A man that undertakes a publick employment, is under a powerful temptation to lose and give up all that quiet, and rest, and tranquillity that a private Station yields; and if not all, yet a great part of his liberty, and divests himself of himself; and do what he can, he must in a great measure give himself up to others, as the price of that honour, pre-eminence and power which he enjoys; which is too dear a purchase for any wise and considerate man that can well avoid it.

3. There is no man so wise, so dexterous in business of publick employment, so attentive to it, nor so fortunate in it, but hath his defects, incogitancies and inadvertencies, or at least misfortunes in it; and these deficiencies in a private station, are less perceived and observed, and the consequences of them are narrow,  
and

and most commonly within the confines of a mans self or his Family : But in a man of a publick employment, first, these defects are more easily observed, and seen ; as his person and station is conspicuous, so his defects are easily seen by any By-stander.

2. As they are easily seen, so they are diligently watched and observed ; he wants not such Spectators as make it their business to be diligent searchers and observers of them.

3. When those defects at any time appear, though perchance they are but few and small, yet they are the objects of most severe censure and animadversion.

If a private mans wisdom, goodness or prudence, do *ad plurimum* overbalance his follies or inadvertencies, the man passeth for a wise and good man ; but a little folly in a man in a great employment, shall cloud and overshadow in the publick esteem all his wisdom and goodness, though this be far the greater.

4. But



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 173

4. But that which is worst of all, the errors, mistakes, miscarriages or inadvertencies of a private man hurts none but himself or his narrow Relations: But even small errors or mistakes, or follies in a man of publick employment, and in the exercise thereof, may be of a vast and comprehensive concern, and the ill consequences thereof oftentimes irreparable. An Error of a Judge in his Judgment, may mislead or undo thousands; an Error in Counsel in a Counsellor, may ruine a State or Kingdom, an Error in Conduct in a General, may destroy an Army: And surely every wise man will as much as he may, keep himself out of these hazardous consequences, since every wise man knows that his is not without his mixtures of folly and weakness.

4. Again, let a man in publick employment, manage them with all the integrity and wisdom imaginable, yet the Race is not alwayes to the swift, nor the battel to the strong; there may be, there will be often times such disap-

disappointments and cross events, that will bring ill success to the best and wisest endeavours, and then notwithstanding all his wisdom and fidelity, the ill success shall be attributed to his want of integrity; courage or wisdom. Every fool will be ready to say, if the Counsel had been thus, the event had been otherwise, and the people shall either perswade themselves, or be perswaded by others, that the man was either false or foolish in his employment; yea, and the State wherein he lived, either to humour the people; or to hold up their credit; and an expectation of better success when others are employed, will be ready to make a politick Sacrifice of such a Minister of State, whose fault was not to be false, or a fool, but only to be unfortunate.

5. Again, There is no politick Officer in the world, but must necessarily make a considerable party of mankind his Enemy: If he be one judicial; he must pronounce to the disadvantage of one party, and then that party

party that hates him, if he be an Officer employed in the issuing of the publick Revenue, he that stays longest for his Money, hates him; if he be employed in dispensation of rewards, offices or places, as Military Commanders, he that is disappointed in his expectation, or that finds less than he expected, hates him: And it will not be material to the safety of him, that is hated, whether there be cause or not, if the party provoked think he hath cause, his indignation is as high as if it were just; and most commonly is provided with a calumny to infuse into the people to make them believe it so. And if it be said in all these and the like cases, the party makes as many Friends as he doth Enemies; for if one be disappointed, another is rewarded; and if one be pronounced against, another is pronounced for: This mends not the matter, for supposed injuries are longer remembred than real benefits; and commonly he that receives a benefit, esteems it his due; he that goes without

without it, thinks it an injury: And hatred and revenge are more active and vigilant to do mischief upon a supposed injury or neglect, than duty or gratitude is to defend one, from whom either Justice or Benefit hath been received.

Upon all these, and many more evident Reasons, it is beyond question, that no considerate man hath reason to be fond of any publick employment, though attended with honour, power and profit; but fairly to decline it if he may: And therefore it is no wonder that *Pomponius Atticus*, who was a wise, knowing man, was so far from seeking it, that he declined it when offered.

2. But supposing that in a calm, sedate time, this wise and good man might have been perswaded to take an honourable publick employment, and that it had not been only consistent with his Wisdom, but his Duty, so to have done; and that if he had declined it, it had been either an argument of pusillanimity or foolishness,

yea,

# POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 177

yea, and injustice to partake of the benefit and protection of the publick Ministers and Officers of *Rome*, and to have denied the same common Offices to others, when by the suffrages or nomination of those who were intrusted therein, he was appointed a publick Minister; yet certainly considering the time wherein he lived, and the great Distempers that prevailed in that State, his declining of publick employments, was not only excusable and justifiable, but also very commendable; and an abstinence full of prudence and great discretion: For he that takes a publick employment in a troubled State, is (without the intervention of a marvellous providence) first, and before any others, exposed to the shock of all publick commotions: If a Faction prevail, if he either oppose it, or be suspected by it, he is sure to be one of the first that must be ruined by it, because he will be thought an impediment to the Design; and it is a wonder if he escape without an

N

Exile

Exile or Confiscation. On the other side, if he be in the good opinion of that Faction, and so continued in his employment, he is under an engagement, not only in the hazard of their Fortune, but also in the pursuit and execution of all those desperate Enterprizes that such a Faction thinks necessary or convenient for their establishment; which if he do not, then unless they otherwise fear him, or exceedingly reverence his person, as one that may credit their Party, he is sure to be dealt more severely with, than if he had at first opposed them. On the other side, if he comply with them, and serve their turns, and prosecute their Designs in the publick station wherein he stands, he shall lose his reputation, and his innocence, and be entangled in a most base servitude, and be made instrumental in those actions which perchance he inwardly abhors; and if he start or boggle at them, he shall be dealt with as the worst of Enemies: And if ever there

# POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 179

there come a turn of Affairs, he shall be sure to be one of the first that is crushed by the prevailing party: And this *Cicero* found to be true, to his cost; for he, that while he was but an Advocate, stood unshaken in all those troublesome times wherein he lived (though he sometimes used his Tongue with too much liberty in his publick Orations) yet when once he became entangled in publick Offices of *Consul* and *Senator*, he quickly felt the power and vindictiveness of the party of *Anthony*, upon his return; and lost his Life in the Fury and Rage of his incensed Adversary, which he had escaped, had he followed the wise example of his Friend *Atticus*, in declining publick employment. And therefore *Cato Uticensis*, who the greatest part of his Life had been concerned in publick Offices and Employments in *Rome*, yet when he found himself over-born by the *Cæsarean* Party, learned, though too late, *Atticus* his wisdom, and left this Legacy to his Son, that he should ne-

ver engage himself in the publick administrations, offices or employment of the Commonwealth.

And truly *Atticus* by this wise abstinence from publick Offices and Employments, obtained much of that Safety and Happiness which he enjoyed.

1. By this means he enjoyed himself and his tranquillity of Mind and Life, and all those advantages and opportunities of improving his Learning and Knowledge, which he could never have had in a publick station.

2. By this means he kept himself free from Enemies or Emulation, Envy and Detraction, the common Attendants of publick and great Employments.

3. By this means he kept both his Safety, his Innocence and Reputation; all of which must necessarily be greatly endangered, if not utterly lost, had he taken upon himself any publick Office in those turbulent times.

4. By



## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 181

4. By this means he preserved his Power, Interest and Veneration among all Parties, and was able to do better Offices with the prevailing party, for the Safeguard and Preservation of good men, than if he had born the greatest Offices, and with the best applause in the City of Rome, as appears by the History of his Life.

---

### CHAP. IX.

*The Fifth Expedient that Atticus used to preserve himself, was, the avoiding of all those Occasions that might procure unto him Emulation or Envy.*

**T**HE Fifth Remedy that he used against the danger of Tumultuous Times, was, to avoid with all care all such things as might procure an Exile, Envy or Emulation against him.

This appears already in part, by his declining of Offices, of Honour, of Power and Profit; but I shall give this as a distinct Consideration, because I shall evidence it with farther Instances.

When he was at *Athens*, he was solicited to accept of honourable employments; but although as a private man, he did them all the friendly Offices he could, yet he refused their publick Honours; they then desired that he would be enrolled as a free Citizen of *Athens*; but this he also refused, as knowing it would be interpreted to be a deserting of his native City of *Rome*, and might procure Enemies, or at least Envy: They also solicited him, that his Statue might be set up at *Athens*, among their Worthies and Benefactors; but this also he would by no means allow of, for the same reason; although after his recess from that City, the Citizens, notwithstanding his refusal, did in his absence set up his Statue.

And

And this refusing of this Piece of Pageantry, namely, the publick setting up of his Statue or Picture, though it seems a small matter, was surely an act of great prudence, for he that allows the setting up of his Statue or Picture, first, draws upon himself much envy: other persons that have not the same honour done them, malign him that hath it, as having that piece of publick favour done him, which another thinks he as well at least deserves.

2. It gives unseen detractions or censure, exposing to every mans eye that Object that administers occasion of censure; *This is that mans Statue, that did such an injury, that committed such an Errour or Oversight:* so it becomes a Monument of so much more disadvantage to the Prototype, by how much men are more apt to take notice of, and remember the evils, than the good of any person. 3. If that State or City take up any distaste against the Person, the poor Statue commonly receives the publick con-

tumely, and the man is prosecuted *in effigie*; he hath committed a *Deposuitum* unto that State or City, that must engage him to their perpetual service and pleasing of them, or in default thereof, to be the Subject of their contumely or publick indignity *in effigia*.

When he came back to *Rome*, besides his refusal of publick and honourable Offices, he kept himself in the state of a private Gentleman; and notwithstanding the access of a fair Estate from his Uncle *Cassius*, he never exceeded his former charge or method of House-keeping; indeed he thereupon enlarged his private liberality and beneficence to persons that stood in need thereof; but he did not at all thereupon advance the Port or Equipage of his House-keeping or manner of living; his House was plain, though noble; and he never would by new Building, make it stately or splendid, but contented himself with it as he found it; and although he were rich, yet to avoid the glory of being said to be a great Purcha-

POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 185

Purchaser, he never would make any new Purchases, but kept the Possessions which were left him by his Father and Uncle, well knowing that great Purchases would make a great noise and rumor, occasion envy, and become but a troublesome burden and incumbrance, rather than a benefit or advantage in a troubled State.

His Money would be a portable commodity for his Subsistence, and ready to supply the necessities and emergencies of himself and his Friends, when his Lands must be necessarily fixed, and in troubled times might yield him little revenue, and were of necessity to abide the Storms of that place wherein they lay. In short, he kept such a mediocrity in his House, his Furniture, his Household-expences, his Entertainments, and the manner of his Living, that neither exposed him to scorn on the one hand, nor censure, or envy, or imputation of affecting either too much Grandeur and Popularity, on the other, nor consumed or wasted his Estate,

Estate, but left himself in a continual capacity of supplying the Exigence of his Friends, which he justly esteemed the best Employment of his Wealth; and yet he so ordered his Affairs and Expences, with that decency and prudence, that kept him above the imputation of baseness or unworthy parsimony. And by this means he avoided envy on the one hand, and contempt on the other, keeping himself in a middle and constant conduct between all extreams. It is true, in the latter end of his Life, he was, by the importunity of *Antonius* and *Octavius*, drawn to match his Niece into the Family and Relation of *Octavius*, which seemed to be a step beyond his degree, and that mediocrity that he used and affected in the former course of his Life: But it was not a thing sought by him, but from him, the great *Triumviri* of *Rome*, being ambitious of his Affinity, whom they very well knew to be a man of as great interest and esteem, and power in the City of *Rome*,

## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 187

Rome, as any private person could possibly be; and that interest, esteem and power bottomed upon as firm a Basis as could possibly be expected; namely, the native and experimented prudence and worth of the man. And therefore they thought that whatever mutability of Fortune their high flying attempts might meet with, yet they had, by this affinity with Atticus, a more firm interest in Rome, than if they had matched their Relation into the Family of a Commander of an Army of forty thousand men. Besides all this, he was rich, and might probably leave a fair Fortune, which he accordingly did. And lastly, the times now seemed pretty well settled, the *Triumvirate* of *Antony*, *Octavius* and *Lepidus* had mastered all opposition, and although there afterwards broke out Wars between *Octavius* and *Anthony*, yet that was not long before *Atticus* his Death, and as he was not likely to live to see those eruptions; so if he should, he could not probably survive

give their issue; neither did he: for he died the year before the Battel of *Albion*, wherein *Anthony* was overthrown by *Octavius*: And yet if these differences had been in his prospect, he was reasonable secure against whatsoever issue should happen in it, both the Heads of that Faction being his Admirers and Friends, and his great Age giving him the Protection and Priviledge of sitting still between them.

---

## CHAP.



CHAP. X.

*The Sixth Expedient, the avoiding  
of all occasions of Enmity from  
any.*

**T**HE Sixth thing that this wise man industriously avoided in order to his Safety, was, all manner of envy from any, and all occasions and opportunities thereof, that humane Prudence could possibly foresee.

This hath been in part shewn before in the precedent Chapters, in his declining of Factions, Offices, and Exaltations of Envy, but it shall be here prosecuted with farther Instances, that more directly and specifically were ordered against this inconvenience, and the former Instances more especially relate to the avoiding

avoiding of publick Differences, and the Enmities arising by it; but these relate to such Enmities as concern a man in a private station.

There be these ensuing occasions, that commonly create Animosities and Enmities.

1. He that is an accuser or Informer against any man for matters of Crime or Misdemeanor, makes the party accused, and all his Relations his Enemies; nay, though he do it but as an Advocate, I do verily believe, that the sharpness of Tully's Tongue in his Declarations, though it procured him some Friends, it created him many more Enemies, that did sit close upon him when they had opportunity; though the occasion of his ruine, was his publick Action. But Atticus was ever careful to avoid this.

He never would be an accuser of any, either as Party or Advocate, nor subscribe any publick Accusation.

2. A second thing that creates Enemies,

mies, is Litigiousness, Contention, and going to Law for every Trifle: This excellent man did with that prudence order his Affairs, that the Author of his Life tells us he never had any Law-Suit. His Wisdom was such, that it prevented him from great or wasting injuries: And his Goodness was such, that he rather forgave Injures of a less magnitude, than prosecuted the wrong-doers: It was one of the great commendations of his Life, that he quickly forgot the Injuries that he received, and the kindness that he had done.

3. A Third thing that creates many enemies, is when a man is Farmer or Collector of those troublesome Duties, where many are concerned, a Publican or Farmer of Customs or Tolls: For such men are commonly hated by the generality of the people. Now *Atticus*, although some Conjectures there are, that he was sometime Farmer of the *Vestigalia*, yet the Writer of his Life assures us the contrary, or certainly if he were  
so

so at any time, he quickly left that Employment, as a probable root of Contentions and Enmity and Animosity.

4. A Fourth thing that creates Enmities, is when a man deals much in the Goods or Lands that are Confiscate by the power of any Faction: Such Confiscations were frequent in Rome, because the vicissitudes of the prevalence of Factions were frequent; and hither persons often came, and met with good Bargains; But *Atticus* wholly declined those publick Markets; not only because it would be a mark of a covetous mind, but because he knew that the former Owners would bear a secret indignation and enmity against the Purchasers and Possessors of their Goods; and such Purchases carried with them a clear evidence that the Purchasers approved the party and violences of those men that thus confiscated and exposed such Goods to Sale; and it was against the Principles of *Atticus*, to give so much countenance or credit

die to the proceedings of any of those Factions.

5. A Fifth thing that often creates men trouble, especially in a troubled State, is the too much prodigality of Speech. An over-free, inconsiderate commendation of some persons of one party, or too liberal Invectives of Censures of the Persons engaged in another, create oftentimes Enemies, and give a man a Blow when he hath forgot it, or thinks not of it; some Enemy of a person commended, or Friend of the person censured, oftentimes reporting to the disadvantage of the first Speaker: In this kind *Atticus* was very wary; he was not liberal of his Tongue either in praises or dispraises of this or that party, or the persons concerned in it. And if any time he commended any person, it was upon the account of his due personal worth and virtue, without contemplation or respect of parties, or the concerns thereof.

Pride and Haughtiness of deportment doth infallibly create more ene-  
 O mics

mies than any one Distemper besides; and indeed is commonly the root of all Contentions and Animosities both in publick and in private persons. A proud man in effect resisteth all men; and therefore doth either necessitate, or at least engage all men to oppose him, and become his enemy: But herein was *Atticus* his great Wisdom, that in his whole course of Life, he always kept an humble mind, and an humble deportment: When he lived at *Athens*, our Author tells us, *Sic se gerebat ut communis infimis par Principibus videretur; ex quo factum est ut huic omnes honores quos possent publice haberent*: The like was his deportment at *Rome*, And certainly this Humility of mind, and deportment, and freeness from all manner of pride, brought him very great advantage, for it kept him in a true estimate and judgment of things. Pride and Vain-glory blinds the judgment; Humility, and Lowliness, renders every thing in its true and just estimate and value.

2. It kept him in great tranquillity of Mind, as well as of Life; it is not possible for any man to suffer so much torture and vexation from all the affronts and injuries without, as from a proud heart that galleth and vexeth it self, when it cannot have its will; but an humble man in all states and conditions stands square upon his own Basis without any great disorder or perturbation.

3. By this means he greatly secured his own safety in publick dangers; for by reason of his humble deportment, he got but few enemies; and if there were any, such this humble carriage either melted them into Friends, or gave that relaxation and abatement to their fervor and animosity, that they never attempted to hurt him, though possibly the prevalence of a Faction wherein they were parties, gave them opportunity.

And yet though his deportment were full of humility and condescension yet it was not without a beholdom

O z

coming

coming Gravity and Grandeur, whereby, though he was affable and cheerful, yet he rendred not himself cheap and contemptible, so that as the Author tells us, it was a hard thing to tell, whether the very same men did more love or fear him.

And certainly this part of *Atticus* his management was a singular means of his safety, and an excellent indication of his prudence, especially in troublesome and difficult times, namely, a wise and circumspect avoiding of making Enemies: It is the common folly of men great in place, power or wealth, to think themselves above the reach of enemies, of the meaner sort especially; and therefore they care not how many they disoblige by their insolence, scorns, injuries or neglects: This is a piece of great weakness and folly; for it is a certain truth, that there is no man, though never so mean, but once in seven years will have an opportunity to do the greatest man much good or much harm. When the Mouse troubled



troubled the sleeping Lion, and disturbed him; and happened to fall under his Paw, he desired the Lion to spare him, he was but a Mouse, and yet might live possibly to do him a kindness; but howsoever was not worth his indignation: the Mouse afterwards served to eat a ~~sonder~~ that Net that entangled the Lion, and so deliver him; that for all his Greatness, could not deliver himself: Kindness, and Affability, and Gentleness are but cheap and easie things, and as easily exercised as Roughness and Acerbity; and when a man can make a friend upon as easie terms as he can make an enemy, he is imprudent if he do the latter; for a mean Friend may be able sometimes to do a great kindness to a great man, and a little enemy may have an opportunity to do a great Mischief.

In tumultuous times an ordinary common Souldier is Master of another mans Life and Estate, either in the unbridled rage of a Storm, or by a false accusation: He therefore that means to sit safe in stormy times, must

be careful with *Atticus*, to avoid the making of Enemies, even in his private station, as well as in his publick, and must never think any person so despicable, but that he may some way or other, or at some time or other, do him a mischief, and therefore must never unnecessarily provoke any, or make him an Enemy, if he can fairly avoid it.

And these are the principal things observable in the Life of *Atticus*, which he principally avoided in order to his Safety and Tranquillity in troublesome times.

an opportunity to do a great kindness  
great man, and a little enemy may have  
sometimes to do a great kindness to a  
let; for a mean friend may be able  
ing, he is impudent if he do the lat-  
as came terms as he can make an end

means to fit life in stormy times must  
I have resolution: The therefore this  
the troubled rage of a storm, or by  
other means Life and Estate, either in  
common Soldier's Master of arms  
In tumultuous times an ordinary

0.3

## C H A P. XI.

*The consideration of the things that Atticus did in order to his Safety and Security against the Dangers and Troubles of the Times; and first, touching his Charity, Bounty and Liberality.*

**I** Have done with those things which this wise man avoided in order to his Safety in troublous times. I come now to the things he did; which as they were worthy and honourable in themselves, so they were the great Means of his Safety and preservation.

In the precedent Chapter, I shewed his Prudence and Industry to avoid making himself Enemies; this was that he consciously avoided: But he did not only avoid the procuring of Enemies, but was prudent and wise

in making very many Friends: This conduced greatly to his Safety and Preservation.

And the means whereby he thus made so many his Friends, was his Liberality, Beneficence and Bounty, especially to those in distress.

But although the safety that he had, was partly the consequence of his many Friends that he procured, and the beneficence that he used, was one great means of procuring Friends; yet herein consisted the excellence of the Man, that he was not bountiful and beneficent upon the bare account of procuring Friends, or by them to secure his safety: But the principle of his beneficence was higher and nobler than his own interest and safety, for it arose from the nobleness of his disposition, and was a certain native generosity and beneficence to Mankind, that prevailed upon him to be grateful to those that did him kindness, bountiful to those he loved, compassionate to those in misery, and beneficent to Mankind in general: Indeed

deed the consequence and effect of this goodness was the multiplication of Friends, and his security in times of danger. But that was not the great Wheel that moved him to it, but the admirable constitution and habit of his Mind, which would have rendered him such, though there had neither been Friends nor safety acquired by it: For he had a self-contentation in the egresses of his own bounty and goodness, though it had never reflected to his own Honour, Safety or Advantage.

And this is the more evident, for that the Instances of his Liberality and Beneficence were most frequent and eminent towards such as were in greatest distress, and below the expectation of ever making a retribution: whereby, as our Author tells us, it was evident that neither Hopes nor Fears, nor Self-ends or Advantage, were the motives of his Liberality, but the Virtue, Goodness, and Beneficence of his Nature and Soul.

But

But because if his Beneficence had been singly to any one single party or Faction, or only to that Faction that were undermost, it might have been interpreted a secret compliance with them, and adherence to them, and so rendered him suspected to those that attained the upper hand, he so wisely ordered his Charity and Beneficence to the oppressed, that at the same time he also liberally presented the Victors; and those things he did not poorly and sneakingly, but boldly and openly, that the oppressed might see he countenanced not their Cause, but regarded their wants; and the Victors might see he durst do good to the necessitous, though their Enemies; and all the World might see that his Charity and Goodness was directed to the Humane Nature, not to encourage or flatter Factions: Some Instances hereof are given in the History of his Life.

When *Marinus* was declared an Enemy to the State, he assisted him with Necessaries in his flight; and when

when *Sylla* a declared Enemy by *Marius*, visited *Atticus* at *Athens*, he entertained him with honour and respect.

When *Pompey* was hardly beset by the power of *Cesar*, he supplied him and his Assistants with Money for their support; and yet at the same time supplied *Cesar* and his Followers with Money for their wants.

When *Brutus* and his Assistants were oppressed by the power of *Anthony*, he supplied them with Necessaries: And when afterwards it was *Anthony's* Fate to be declared a public Enemy, and his condition seemed desperate, inasmuch that the very Friends of *Anthony* turned bitter Enemies of *Anthony's* Family; he then undertook the Patronage and protection of the Family of *Anthony*, relieved and supported *Fulvia*, the Wife of *Anthony*, and *Volumnius*, one of his Family; and stood between them and the violence used against them, and supplied them with Necessaries.

And

And in this Liberality and Beneficence of *Atticus*, these things are very observable.

1. That it was full of sincerity and integrity; his greatest Bounty and Erogations commonly employed upon those that were not in any likelihood of making him any return; such were his distribution of Corn among the poor at *Athens*, his relief of *Marius*, *Pompey*, *Brutus*, and the Family of *Anthony*, when they were at the lowest, and their Cases seemingly desperate; *Nec Desperatos reliquit*.

2. That it was full of equality and impartial; If *Brutus* were in distress, he relieved him; if *Anthony*, though of a contrary Faction, were in distress, he relieved him: His Liberality was not *intuitu partis*, or governed by regard to any particular Faction; but *intuitu humani generis*, a common benignity to humane Nature, that whatsoever the party was, yet if he were in distress, he had the experience of his Bounty. And upon the observation hereof, neither party took amiss what



what he did for the other, because they found he did the like for them, when their turn was to be lowermost. And indeed the vicissitudes of the successes of the Factions of *Marius* and *Sylla* had made all parties wise, so that they became pretty well contented to find such a common Promptuary and Treasury of Beneficence, which though their suppressed Adversary now tasted, might be of equal advantage to them at the next turn of Fortune.

3. That it was full of singular prudence: *Pompey* and his party were in some distress, he relieved them; *Cesar* wanted not his Relief; yet *Atticus* presents him liberally; this was not to bribe each party; but it was to give assistance to their necessities: *Cesar* no less honoured him than *Pompey*. And by these prudent Contemporations he made his Liberality safe, and gave assurance to all parties, that the Bounty to either party, was not a compliance with parties, but an excellent beneficence to Mankind in general. And

And therefore when either party solicited him to any thing that favoured of the countenance of a Faction, he constantly declined it; as when *Sylla* perswaded him to go with him to *Italy*, and the party of *Brutus* solicited him to contribute to a private Treasury for *Brutus*, and *Pompey* endeavoured to draw him to his Army. By all which, all parties and all men were fully satisfied that the Bounty of *Atticus* was not in contemplation of Factions, or for private designs or ends, but the emanation of a noble and benign Soul, full of rivers of Goodness, Clemency and Beneficence,

And now we will a little consider the singular effects that this Beneficence, Liberality and Charity had in all the Successes of his Life.

1. By this means he removed out of the Minds of all men all that envy which commonly waits upon Wealthy men; for he was so true a Steward, and generous Dispenser of the Wealth he had, that no man en-  
vied

vied his Riches, but wished it more: For they well knew that when their misfortunes or necessities made them stand in need of relief, he was ready to dispose of it for their supply.

2. There is nothing in the world renders a man more popular and beloved of all, and so it made him.

And although Popularity is a dangerous thing in a State, when it meets in an ambitious Spirit, yet it is safe and desirable when found in a good, and peaceable, and wise man.

3. This Liberality or Bounty was so diffusive, that it exceedingly multiplied his Friends: Every man that had tasted of his Bounty, became his Friend and Advocate; insomuch that there was no one party or Faction in Rome, but had a considerable person of it obliged unto Atticus, by his Benefits, whereby it came to pass that in all the Revolutions and Vicissitudes of successes of contesting Factions, he never wanted some considerable persons in power, that were studious of serving him and his Friends, and  
were

were his Advocates, if he had occasion.

4. Consequently this Bounty and Liberality of *Atticus* was one of the great Instruments of Safety in all those various Revolutions that happened in *Rome* during his Life. This was one thing that rendred *Atticus* so safe, and so acceptable to *Cesar*, after his return Victor over *Pompey*: The kindness and liberality which he shewed to the Family and Relations of *Anthony* in his distress, was that which rendred him so acceptable to *Anthony*, at his return Victor over *Brutus*; that while thousands were banished or destroyed, and *Cicero* himself slain in the rage of that Revolution, *Atticus* was protected and highly favoured; insomuch that he obtained protection not only for himself, but divers of his Friends that were in the Black List of Death, Confiscation, or Banishment, as appears at large in the History of his Life.

It is true that this Expedient of Safety is not exerciseable by men of mean

mean Fortunes, neither is it needful for them; men of low condition have much of their security in times of common distraction, from that which ordinarily mistaken men account a piece of misery or infelicity, namely, their poverty; such be below the storms and tempests in a State, they blow over them, and rarely hurt them, unless they are over-busie or wilfully entangle themselves in them: But Wealth and Greatness stand in the eye of Troubles and Storms of this nature, because it commonly invites every necessitous or ambitious man to make such the prize of Rapine; and therefore the wisdom of this man that was wealthy and eminent, is more conspicuous, in that he enjoyed his Peace together with his Wealth, and so prudently managed the latter, that he secured the former; and yet without any enormous detriment or wasting of his Wealth, while he wisely placed such part thereof that he could rea-

P

sonably

sonably spare, and hereby secured both himself and a fair competency of the rest.

And these were the Effects of this excellent mans Bounty and Liberality, which alwayes returned with great advantage to his Honour and Safety.

---

CHAP.

---

CHAP. XII.

*The Second thing which Atticus did in order whereby he secured himself.*

THE Second Observable in the practice of *Atticus*, was his constancy to his Friends under all conditions; whereby he never ceased to do them all Offices of Kindness and Beneficence, were their Fortunes never so low, and desperate.

*Marinus*, though a turbulent person, yet was personally the Friend of *Atticus*, and his Son bred up at School with him; when the Father fled from *Rome*, he supplied him with necessities in his flight.

*Pompey* was a Friend of *Atticus*, and in his distress *Atticus* supplied him liberally in his necessities.

*Brutus* was a familiar Acquaintance

of *Atticus*, and when he was forced to desert *Rome*, he supplied him in his streights and necessities with Money, and after the Battel at *Philippi*, where *Brutus* was slain, maintained *Servilia* his Mother, and used his Interest with *Anthony*, and procured the liberty of many of his Friends that were taken after that Battel, as *Gellius*, *Caninus*, *Julius Canidius*, and others; the like he did after the Battel of *Philippi*, for *Julius Morilla* the Pretor, *Aulus Torquatus*, and the Son of *Quintius* his Brother-in-Law, and others of his Friends that were engaged in the quarrel and misfortune of *Pompey*: Thus he always improved his interest that he had in *Julius Caesar*, *Anthony*, and other the Heads of great Factions in *Rome*, when the Victory fell on their side, not to make himself rich or great, but to deliver his friends from the common calamities that beset them in the fall of that Party wherein they were unhappily engaged: Only the Ruine of *Cicero* was so sudden, that it prevented the intercession of *Atticus* in his behalf.

Neither



## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 213

Neither can I omit that admirable piece of fidelity to his Friends, and yet that admirable Prudence, that though it fell out oftentimes that many of his Friends were engaged in opposite Factions, and extream animosities and irreconcilable differences, yet so he ordered the Matter, that he kept an intimate Friendship with them all, corresponded with them all, and had the entire Love and Service of them all without any breach of Friendship, or incurring the displeasure or jealousy of any of them or of their Relations: *Marius* was his Friend, and so was *Sylla*, and yet engaged in irreconcilable enmity between themselves. *Pompey* was his Friend, and so was *Julius Caesar*, yet engaged in desperate Wars each against the other. *Brutus* was his Friend, and so was *Anthony*, yet mortal Enemies one against another.

Again, *Anthony* was his Friend, and so was *Octavius Caesar*, and yet both implacable enemies each to other.

*Cicero* and *Hortensius* the two greatest Masters of Eloquence of *Rome*, had great emulations between them, and yet notwithstanding all those bitter and irreconcilable Feuds and Emulations between these Friends of *Atticus*, though he were not able to reconcile their differences, he still kept up an entire Friendship with them all, correspondent with them by Letters, Entertainments, and all Offices of Friendship with them all, was bountiful to them all, relieved them all in the vicissitudes of their Exigences and Misfortunes, and kept himself yet free from engaging in their Differences, nor rendered himself suspected to either party. They all knew his integrity and his wisdom, and were abundantly satisfied that his Friendship and Beneficence to either party, were acts of pure and generous goodness, and not leavened, or tainted, or stained with base Ends, or Hopes, or Designs. And this Fidelity and Constancy to his Friends, caused all men to love and honour him, and to desire his

his Friendship, and engaged his Friends in great firmness and fidelity to him. And this among all the rest of his honest and prudent managements, was a great security to him: For, as before I observed, his Friends were hereby so multiplied and encreased, that there was not, nor indeed could be any party in *Rome*, but had a considerable number of the Friends of *Atticus*, whom he had formerly engaged by great benefits mingled with it, which were as so many Protectors, or at least Advocates and Instruments of his Safety and Preservation upon any Revolutions that happened or could happen in the City or State of *Rome*.

---

## C H A P. XIII.

*The Third Expedient conducing to the Safety of Atticus ; his admirable moderation and equality of Mind and Actions.*

ONE of the greatest Enemies to any mans Peace and Safety, is the immoderation and excess of passion which ordinarily carries men into excesses and extreams, and creates to a man Enemies and troubles if it find none ; transports men beyond the bounds of Wisdom or Reason ; sometimes it breaks out into rude, harsh and offensive actions, sometimes into provoking and irritating Speeches, and alwayes disorders the judgment, and brings precipitation and inadvertence into the actions : But our worthy person

son was quite of another Make; he governed his passions, and thereby governed his Actions and Speeches, was deliberate, and considerate, and of great moderation: He was not presently transported to love and admire every man that either did him a kindness, or was great in the Commonwealth; he understood and weighed wherein their ends and designs lay: neither was he presently transported with hatred and indignation of every person that was voted an Enemy by the Senate; he allowed something in those Sentences to the Passions, Interests and Ends of Persons, Parties and Factions: Though he was an Enemy to Faction in the State, yet he did not presently conclude that all the men that were engaged in a Party, were Enemies to the Commonwealth; he considered that some might mean well, and were ignorant of the Designs and Ends of those that commonly governed the Party; who like a prevailing Humor or Distemper, many times carried weak or well-meaning

meaning men beyond their intentions, and therefore he was not of that common humor of the Vulgar, whereof it is said,

*Sequitur Fortunam semper; & odit  
Damnatos.*

And therefore as on the one side he was not cheated into parties by the goodly pretences of them that raised or managed them; so he was not transported with hatred & detestation of all that were of them: As he had his Allay that made him not overcredulous of the former, so he had an allowance of Charity and Gentleness for the latter; whereby he was moderate in his Censures of them, and his dislike of them and their proceedings, left still a room for their relief in their necessities, and for an intercession for mercy for them, with those in power.

He looked upon the commotions in the State of both sides to be but the product of Faction, a Disease and Distemper, not the true Temperament

ment and Complexion of the State, and therefore in the collision of Factions, he did not presently judge that the best that prevailed, nor that the worst that was suppressed, they had each their errors, and faults, and mischiefs to the Commonwealth, which possibly were in themselves equal, notwithstanding the discrimination of the success: And therefore he did not presently fall in with the prevailing party, and adore it, nor deny those measures of Charity to the adverse party, which he used to deal to them in distress; possibly he thought them not less innocent than the former, though less fortunate, and therefore esteemed them much at one in their merit or rather demerit; only the distressed stood more in need of his Charity than the Victors, and therefore they had more of it.

Again, when he saw the Rage and Fury, and Proscriptions, and Condemnations that the conquering party used against those that had been engaged on the other side, though he  
hated

hated and detested that Cruelty and Fierceness that he saw exercised by Citizens of the same Commonwealth and City, against their Fellow-Citizens, as breaches not only of the Bonds of Civil Society, but as Invasions upon Humanity it self; yet he still governed himself with that moderation, as not to fall foul upon the Victors with publick Invectives and Phillippiques: For he well knew that would but irritate and provoke their Rage, and possibly disable him to do those Offices of kindness for his Friends that fell under the power of the Victors: And besides, Experience of the Vicissitudes of Successes in adverse Factions, had well assured him that it was the common Method of which soever Faction prevailed, to use all Extremities against the other: And although this cruel Custom did no way justify the things they did, nor rendred them excusable in the judgment of *Atticus*; yet it gave a little allay to the censure of their severity, that had  
the



POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 221

the other Faction prevailed, they would have done no less by them.

And this moderation of *Atticus* gave him great security in troublesome times, procured him Friends, kept him considerate and circumspect in all he did, that he never overshot himself with Folly, Passion or precipitancy in words or action.

---

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Concerning the Fourth Expedient  
conducting to the Safety of Atti-  
cus; his Constancy.*

IF I should follow *Atticus* through all those expressions of his Prudence and Wisdom, joined with singular Vertue and Goodness, my Observations would be too voluminous: The truth is, there is scarce any one part or passage of his Life, but deserves remark. My Author truly says, *Difficile est omnia dicere, & non necessaria*: I shall therefore conclude all with this one Observation more; namely, his *Constancy*.

I. He was constant to his Friends, even in their lowest and most desperate condition; he ever retained his Love to them, and it was not a complementary Love, but such as expressed

fed it self in real indications, relieving them in their extremities, engaging all his Endeavours and interest for their deliverance out of dangers, and never giving over his endeavours till he effected what was possible for their good and safety.

2. He was constant to his Mode and Fashion of Life; he lived in the same House, without any considerable alteration, kept the same Equipage, notwithstanding the encrease and access of his Fortune; the same Rules and Observances in his Household, his Entertainments, his House-keeping, *pari fastigio stetit in utraque Fortuna.*

3. He was constant to his Principles; what he once was, he alwayes was; and what he once practised, he alwayes practised; he used the same moderation and equality, the same Justice and Integrity, the same quietness and evenness of mind, the same Virtue and Goodness, the same Piety and Honour to his Parents, the same Humility and Affability,  
the

the same Gravity and Decency, the same Compassion to the afflicted, the same Bounty and Liberality to all; and no variation of Successes or Fortunes, no Dislikes or Distastes of other men, no Hopes, no Fears, no persuasions, no sinister Ends or Designs could shake him from his Principles, or unsettle him from his *Basīs* of Honour or Virtue, upon which he stood fixed, square and unmoveable. And therefore when *Anthony* was in his lowest condition, declared an Enemy to the State, *Brutus* and *Cassius* in the vogue and esteem in *Rome*, and seemed to ride upon the strength of the Common breath of popular applause, and yet in this condition of Affairs, *Atticus* assisted and protected the Family of *Anthony* with his Money and Interest in their lowest and deplorable condition: And when the great men of the time began to look sour upon him, and complained, *quod parum odisse malos Cives videretur*: That he was too favourable to the publick Enemies of the State,

State, yet he continued constant in his way, and as our Author tells us, rather thought it his honour for him to practice what was fit for him to do, than what others would command.

And certainly this Constancy of *Atticus* to his Friends, to Himself, to his Principles, was not only his Honour but his Safety; all the World looking upon him as a common Benefactor to Humane Nature, not changed nor shaken from his Goodness by any variety of Fortune. A man that is unstable or tottering is loved by no man, because he is not fit to be trusted; but a man constant to worthy and generous Principles retains the like constancy of Esteem and Veneration from all men, and together with his honour and esteem and worth, commonly retains his safety and security in publick concussions.

And thus I have gathered out of the History of the Life of *Atticus* such things as seemed to me

Q

the

the great means of his unexampled peace, safety, honour, tranquillity and happiness in a continued *series* of incomparable and matchless concussions and storms in the *Roman* State, I shall conclude with these few general Observations upon his Life, and with some Cautions touching it. The Observations are these :

1. That most certainly Virtue, Goodness, and Integrity is the best Policy and greatest means of Safety in the most dangerous times and places.

2. That most certainly Virtue and Goodness and Integrity is the truest way for any man to gain true honour, veneration, and esteem among men; it is more conducive than Riches, and Armies, and Triumphs, and Victories.

3. That as it is the truest way to get Honour, so it is the best means to keep it, because such an Honour hath not its dependence upon any thing without a man; his Fortune, Wealth, Power, or Success, these  
are

are changeable and variable; but a good, wise, and virtuous man carries the root and spring of his Honour in himself, he shall never cease to be honoured till he cease to be good.

4. That there is a secret veneration of Goodness and Virtue in all men, even in the worst and vilest; a man cannot so far put off Humanity, but that Goodness, Wisdom, and Virtue will have so much of party and interest in his nature, that he cannot choose but pay a secret approbation, veneration, and esteem to those that have it.

5. That consequently Wisdom, Beneficence, Virtue, and Goodness have a great connaturality to Humane Nature, and are the true genuine Spirit or *Genius* of it, and that it is so, is evident, 1. By the great good it procures to Humane Nature, Honour, and Safety; and 2. By the great esteem that Mankind hath of it, and the common interest it obtains in the common Nature of Mankind.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Touching certain Cautions to be  
used in the Observation and Imitation  
of the Life of Atticus in  
publick collisions of Factions.*

**W**E have seen in the former Discourse not only the singular Virtue and Goodness of *Atticus*, but also his admirable Safety in times of publick Factions and Com-motions in the State of *Rome*.

And yet we may observe in his Life some things practised by him with great success and security, which yet were things of great danger and hazard, and possibly such as may not be undertaken or adventured upon by others, and exceed the limits of common Example. When a person is by the lawful supreme Authority of a State or Country declared a publick  
Enemy



Enemy, or a Traytor, proscribed or banished, ordinarily common humanity of all States allows of relief and support to his Wife, Children, Family, Servants and dependents, but for the most part (if not always) forbids supplies to be sent to the person thus proscribed, or declared an Enemy, or any communication or converse with him; because though possibly it may be all done upon a personal account, and *intuitu personæ*, without respect to his condition in relation to the Publick; yet it cannot choose but be a support to him, and a countenance of him, whereby he may be enabled to gather new supplies, or at least courage or encouragement for farther attempts to the promoting of his Faction, Party, or Designs. And although in the *Roman* State those declarations of Enemies, whether *Marcus*, or *Sylla*, or *Brutus*, or *Anthony*, or *Pompey*, or *Cæsar*, were obtained by the prevalence and sollicitation of the adverse Party or Faction, and were in a manner

extracted from the Senate and People; yet it is plain, that according to the Constitution of the *Roman* Republick, the supreme Authority was lodged in the Senate, or Senate and People; and therefore the publick Acts, Decrees, or Laws made by them were in force till repealed by the like Solemnity or Authority, though perchance at first unduly obtained. For such veneration is necessarily due to Laws or Constitutions enacted by the full, supreme, legislative, legal power, according to the true Constitution of the Civil Government, that they are not to be rescinded by private persons, upon their pretence of being unduly obtained, till they are regularly avoided by the like legal power by which they were enacted or instituted.

And therefore a private person (such as *Atticus* was, or any other might be) that should go about to relieve and supply *Marius* or *Sylla*, *Pompey* or *Julius Caesar*, *Brutus* or *Anthony*, *Octavius* or *Lepidus* while they were under these

these publick Declarations or Proscriptions by the Civil Power of the *Roman* State, according to the settled Laws of that State, must needs be under a violation of the Law, and subjected to the danger and inconvenience that ariseth from violations of publick Laws. Besides, it may seem this liberty taken by *Atticus* of relieving persons thus declared Enemies to the Commonwealth, and holding such intimate correspondence with them, neither became a good Citizen nor a good Man, which according to the old standard of the *Roman* Morals, was,

*Qui consulta patrum, qui leges jurâque  
servat.*

And therefore though the general Scheme of the Life of *Atticus* afford a prudent and good Example of Imitation, especially in the like state of Affairs, yet it were hard to make him a pattern of imitation in this particular of his supplies of Enemies, so

publicly declared by the true supreme power of the *Roman* State, (I say the true supreme power of the *Roman* State) nor in his correspondence with them. For it is so far from proving a man's safety, that, according to the usual Methods and Laws of Government, it exposeth a man to the greatest danger, and that even by the Law it self.

What *Atticus* therefore did in this kind, is singular and scarce compatible to another person; because it is hardly possible that any other person could be under the same circumstances with *Atticus* when he used this practice, and therefore that which he did in this kind with safety, yea and honour to himself, may not be ventured upon by any person that stands otherwise circumstantiated, and studies his safety.

Although the *Roman* State were severe enough in prohibiting supplies to their foreign Enemies, or holding correspondence, or *clandestina cum hostibus colloquia*, yea and had and used the

the like strictness in relation to those Mutinies, or Conspiracies, or Rebel-  
 lions immediately or directly levelled  
 against the State or Commonwealth  
 it self; as in the Conjuraton of *Cati-*  
*line*, their *Bella servilia* with their  
 Slaves, and the like; yet it should  
 seem at this time they had not that  
 strict animadversion against the dis-  
 senting Parties or Factions, which  
 though they were bitter and cruel one  
 towards another, yet they all pre-  
 tended a common love and care of  
 the Commonwealth or Government  
 closely, and each party possibly at  
 some times might really intend the  
 prosperity and advancement thereof,  
 though the means whereby they at-  
 tempted it proved pernicious to that  
 end.

2. Again and principally, although  
 by the power and industry of a pre-  
 vailing Faction the Senate and People  
 were oftentimes brought to counte-  
 nance them with a Decree or Law  
 in their favour, and with a Proscrip-  
 tion or Declaration to the disadvan-  
 tage

tage of the adverse party, yet every body knew that it was but a kind of forced compliance by the true Body of the Senate or People, and that the concern lay meerly between the parties litigant, and not so much in the true *Genius* of the *Roman* Government, which would have been glad to have been free from both the Competitors, or at least from their Competition: And therefore the animadversions and severities used against either Party, though they were oftentimes great and cruel, yet were not so much from the temper of the *Roman* Government, as from the distemper, jealousy, animosity and hatred between the contending Parties themselves: and therefore they that suffered, looked upon their sufferings not as so much the exertions of the Justice of the *Roman* State, as the violence of the prevailing party.

3. Again, the various successes that those Factions and their Heads and Parties had in the common experience,

rience and in their successes, seemed by degrees to make men sensible, that a good man and beneficent was necessary to be protected, because no party knew whether it might not shortly be his turn to make use of his beneficence: So that a man not addicted to either Faction as a party in it, was by a kind of tacit compact free from animadversion or punishment for his assistance to the oppressed; and was spared in these publick Concussions, as Temples or Sacred places are in time of publick Hostility.

4. But again, *Atticus* had given in the whole course of his Life most certain and infallible indications that he did not, would not engage in either Party or Faction, and that he did with an equal indifferency supply the necessities, and endeavour to remove the calamities of any of what Party soever he was; and bare a fair and equal respect to all of what Party soever, whether of the Party of *Marius* or *Sylla*, of *Cesar* or *Pompey*,  
of

of *Brutus* or *Anthony*; by all which all men concluded him to be a common Friend to Mankind; but no fomenter, or encourager, or maintainer of any Faction. And it is scarce possible for any other man to have all these happy circumstances to contribute to that common good opinion that all Parties, yea all men had of *Atticus*; whereby it came to pass that these supplies and correspondencies that he held with the several engaged Parties, never brought him into the danger or suspicion of being a promoter or favourer of their Factions, or to render those his acts of Humanity any way unsafe or dangerous to him.

And therefore since the danger that might befall *Atticus* in his relief of those that were declared Enemies to the Commonwealth, must necessarily arise either from the resentment of the Senate and People of *Rome*, in relieving those they had declared Enemies, or from the jealousy, indignation and animosity of that Party

or



## POMPONIUS ATTICUS. 237

or Faction that then obtained, and might be offended at his kindness to an adverse Party: He was in both these respects under a competent degree of security, notwithstanding those supplies and correspondencies: For the Senate and People of *Rome*, though by the force of a prevailing Party they were drawn to, or rather driven to make Decrees and Declarations in their favour, and against the other Party; yet in truth they really disliked both, and would have been glad to be at quiet; and therefore were not over-eager, or busie, or fierce in prosecuting those that were beneficent to either Party, especially if he were no Friend to the Faction itself.

And on the other side, the Factions themselves were not over-violent in their animadversions upon *Atticus* his Beneficence to either Party, because it was apparent he did it not in contemplation or favour of a Faction, but as a common Benefactor to men in want and extremity: And so between

tween both he escaped those severities which possibly the rigour of the Law might have inflicted upon an assistant to a declared Enemy, or the jealousy of a prevailing Party might have brought upon him.

5. Again, he was a man of that great and deserved reputation for his Prudence, Learning, Worth, Love to his Countrey, Liberality, Beneficence, Sincerity, that he had a high veneration with all men of all Parties and Factions; every man thought it a kind of barbarousness and inhumanity to accuse or injure such a person especially that had so obliged all Mankind. When a bold Tribune did accuse *Scipio Africanus* that great Roman Captain, he answered his Accusation with no other language, but led the People up to the Capitol and other places where the Monuments of his Triumphs and Benefits to the Roman State gave them the fresh remembrance of his Merits, and thereupon the Accusation vanished, and the Accuser slunk away ashamed of his

his Attempt. But in all the whole Life of *Atticus* we find not so much as any Accusation of him, no not to the Heads themselves of the combating parties. He was so much above Censure, that he never so much as fell under any Accusations; which possibly may be a priviledge that few men living in publick Concussions, and of any eminence, are capable of.

And therefore as this Example of the Liberality of *Atticus* to parties obnoxious to a publick declaration of being Enemies to the State, and his familiarity, intimacy, and correspondency with them may be a signal evidence of his Wisdom, yea and also of his fortunate success under so dangerous Adventures; yet it cannot be allowed to be a common Example to other persons to run the like hazard, because it is morally impossible they should be under such happy and beneficial circumstances in this kind as *Atticus* was, and therefore cannot expect the like success therein as he found.

Indeed

Indeed if the Senate and People of *Rome* that made these Decrees in favour of those that got into the Saddle, had been but Usurpers of the supreme Authority, or had it not been really and legally fixed in them, or had they been a pack of men that had but pretended the supreme Authority, and the State-power of making Laws or politick Edicts, Proscriptions, and Declarations of this nature, without any legal and true power so to do: It had not only been an act of nobleness and generosity, but possibly of duty, to have ministred relief and supply to those that were oppressed by them. But the Case was otherwise; the true supreme Authority of the *Roman* State was engaged in those Edicts and Proscriptions, though drawn thereunto by the power of a prevailing Party. And therefore the adventure of *Atticus* was great in ministering supplies to those that fell under those Sentences and Decrees, though his great Wisdom in managing thereof, the great and publick veneration of

of his goodness, and the junctures of the affairs of the *Roman* State, rendred him safe and secure from danger under that adventure. And whosoever shall adventure in like manner, had need be sure his Circumstances be the same with those of *Atticus*, and that he hath as good a Judgment, yea, and Fortune also, to discern and weather Difficulties, as he had, otherwise in such Adventures he cannot be without great danger.

And as I have added this Caution touching the practice of *Atticus*, in his Life, so there is another Caution to be added touching his Deportment near his Death. It seems to me, that his obstinate resolution not to take any nourishment to preserve his Life, because it would prolong his pain together with his Life, was not at all commendable; but as it savoured too much of impatience, unbecoming a Philosopher, so it was an act of much wilful imprudence; for the receiving of convenient nourishment, might prolong his Life, and possibly abate his

R pain.

pain. But the wilful refusal of it must necessarily be (as it was) an immediate cause of his Death, which he thereby hastened; and although self-Murder was grown too much in fashion among some of the Grandees of *Rome*, as appears by the instance of *Cato* and others, yet certainly it was a practice not only of Inhumanity, but of much Pusillanimity and Impotence of Mind, and a miserably mistaken choice, to choose Death, the worst of Evils, rather than endure Pain or Disgrace in the world; which a little Philosophy would have taught them to bear with patience, rather than to avoid by destroying their own Lives.

F I N I S.

---

## ERRATA.

**P**Ag. 9. l. 23. r. *Province*. p. 17. l. 19. for *note* r. *not*. p. 36. l. 15. r. *11th year*. p. 41. r. 4628. p. 45. l. 5. r. *fermented*. p. 57. l. 6. r. *Gentlest Animadversions*. p. 59. l. 24. r. *aided*. p. 69. l. 9. r. *evil Engine*. p. 73. l. 6. r. *Gilded all their*. l. 21. r. *Protections of*. p. 82. l. 7. dele *rather*. l. 14. r. *Consulate of Marius*. p. 87. l. 2. r. *in or again*. p. 93. l. 21. for *strange and foreign*, r. *strong and firm*. p. 98. l. 4. r. *or like means*. p. 99. l. 16. r. for *the state*, *his stake*. p. 104. l. 4. r. *who will*. p. 114. l. 1. r. *opposed them*. p. 118. l. 20. r. *Air*, but. p. 134. l. 22, 23. r. for *the later*, *both will come*. p. 153. l. 27. r. *they put*. p. 158. l. 18. r. *were obvious to*. p. 161. l. 9. r. *Great men especially, if inclinable to any Faction*. p. 165. l. 8. r. CHAP. IX. and so for all the rest of the Chapters to the end of the Book on forward. p. 174. l. 22. r. *No publick*. l. 25. r. *Injudicial*. l. 26. r. *Employments be must*. p. 190. l. 15. r. *His declamations*. p. 199. l. 23. r. *constantly avoid*. p. 225. l. 5. r. *others would commend*. p. 230. l. 1. r. *extorted from*.

---





---

## ADDENDA.

Pag. 92. Between Line 12 and 13,  
insert as followeth.

**I**T is true that the lawful Governors of a Kingdom or State, must necessarily sometimes use great severities upon Rebels and Disturbers of the Government; and this is necessary as well by way of just retribution of great demerits, but principally for example, and so prevent others from the like Exorbitances, *Ut Pæna ad paucos, Metus ad omnes*: Rewards and Punishments being as well the two great Pillars that support Government, as the two great Wheels that keep it in a regular and orderly Motion.

But yet there is great Prudence and Moderation to be used therein, as well in reference to the kinds and degrees of the punishments, as in the  
extent

## ADDENDA.

extent of them; for if they be too inhumane and barbarous, or be extended to all the persons that are Offenders (when the number of them possibly is very great) it may prove like Physick that is too strong for the Bodies, and brings many times greater danger than the Disease it designs to cure.

But the Case of those Factions in *Rome*, was not like that of the Civil Magistrate in punishing Malefactors in a State; but it was the Passions and Animosities of one Faction or Party against another, and therefore such horrid and extensive severities that they used one against another, rendred their severities and the extent of them, as unexcusable, so in the event, dangerous and unsuccessful to those that used them; the reason above given.

## ADDENDA.

Pag. 144. Between Line 7, and 8, add,

It is true that he relieved *Brutus* after his Exile; but so he also relieved *Anthony* after his Exile, though both were extream Enemies each to other; but still it was for their private relief, not to support their Factions. *Brutus* used him as his great Councillor, as we are told in his Life: But it was not upon the account of *Brutus* his publick undertakings, but only touching his private Concerns; which appears beyond all question, in that in their highest Familiarity and Friendship, he refused not only to subscribe for the Treasure designed for *Brutus*, but would not so much as meet about it.